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CONSTRUCTING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT:
BORROWING AND SECOND AMENDMENT
DESIGN CHOICES *
JACOB D. CHARLES **
In fleshing out the contours of the nascent Second Amendment, both courts and
commentators have looked to established constitutional rights for guidance.
Many, for example, have imported the analytical scaffolding of the First
Amendment, including its heightened protection for “core” constitutional conduct
and measured review for regulations akin to “time, place, and manner”
restrictions. Others have lifted the “undue burden” test from its context in
reproductive-autonomy jurisprudence to assess the burden a law imposes on the
right to keep and carry firearms. Still others have found a parallel in the
historical inquiry required to evaluate claims under the Seventh Amendment.
Drawing on the concept of constitutional borrowing, this Article is the first to
systematically trace these links between the Second Amendment and other
constitutional rights. It explores the sources from which Second Amendment
cases and scholarship borrow, and why that borrowing occurs. And, after tracing
these links, this Article explains how we should evaluate these instances of
borrowing the same way we evaluate other types of analogical reasoning in law:
by whether they are grounded in relevant similarities. Finally, this Article
argues that current borrowing in Second Amendment jurisprudence falls short
in two ways and then sketches a path forward. First, Second Amendment
borrowing ought to pay more attention to the theoretical underpinnings for the
right to keep and bear arms; and second, the practice ought to pay more attention
to the reasons why some elements should be borrowed from one rights domain
while others should be rejected.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 334
I.
THE VARIETIES OF SECOND AMENDMENT BORROWING ..... 341
A. The (Re)Birth of a Right in Heller ...................................... 341
B. The Types and Sources of Second Amendment Borrowing ........ 345
1. Borrowing a Methodological Framework.................... 346
* © 2021 Jacob D. Charles.
** Lecturing Fellow, Duke University School of Law & Executive Director, Duke Center for
Firearms Law. Many thanks to Joseph Blocher, Darrell Miller, Brandon Garrett, Eric Ruben, Guy
Charles, Stuart Benjamin, Daniel Rice, and the participants in the Duke Law Junior Scholars Workshop
for invaluable comments and feedback and to Lexie Burton for terrific research assistance. Thanks also
to the excellent North Carolina Law Review editors for their superb work on this Article.

99 N.C. L. REV. 333 (2021)

334

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

2. Borrowing Substantive Law ....................................... 350
JUSTIFYING BORROWING ...................................................... 355
A. Borrowing and Analogical Reasoning ................................... 355
B. Relevant Similarities in the Second Amendment .................... 360
1. Textual ..................................................................... 361
2. Historical .................................................................. 363
3. Functional ................................................................. 364
4. Structural .................................................................. 367
III. A PATH FORWARD FOR SECOND AMENDMENT
BORROWING ......................................................................... 369
A. Taking Theory Seriously ..................................................... 369
B. Disaggregating Borrowing ................................................... 373
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 376
II.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine that tomorrow researchers discovered an additional constitutional
amendment that had in fact been duly ratified in 1791: “The full and equal rights
of conscience shall not be in any manner, or on any pretext infringed.” 1 How
would judges deal with claims brought under this newly discovered
amendment? The phrasing is enigmatic, the founding era debates about its
scope are minimal or nonexistent (let us assume), and no prior Supreme Court
precedent sheds light on its scope.
Something almost like that happened with the Second Amendment. “For
more than two centuries,” Judge Posner observed, “the ‘right’ to private
possession of guns . . . had lain dormant,” a mere “spectral subject[] of
theoretical speculation.” 2 It was not until 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller
(Heller I), 3 that the Supreme Court first construed the Second Amendment to
protect a legally enforceable right to keep and bear arms for self-defense. 4 Since
then, judges, advocates, and scholars have been confronted with almost as much
uncertainty as those faced with the hypothetical equal-conscience amendment.

1. Colleen A. Sheehan, The Measure and Elegance of Freedom: James Madison and the Bill of Rights,
15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 513, 523 (2017) (quoting James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution,
(June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 201 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland
eds., 1979)). This “equal-conscience amendment” was part of James Madison’s original proposal for
inclusion in the Bill of Rights. See id. (describing how Madison saw the right of conscience as
foundational for all other rights).
2. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008),
https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness
[https://perma.cc/XFL8-3XE3
(dark
archive)].
3. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
4. Id. at 635.
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One predominant way they have dealt with the uncertainty is by looking to
familiar tools to operationalize the provision’s guarantee. 5
By and large, courts and commentators have relied heavily on the doctrinal
scaffolding built around more established constitutional rights. 6 They have, in
short, engaged in constitutional borrowing. Constitutional borrowing is “the
practice of importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from
one area of constitutional law into another.” 7 In some ways, this borrowing is
unavoidable. Constitutional rights are fundamentally “relational.” 8 Over time,
they “interact, associate, converse, and conflict with one another.” 9 The story
of the post-Heller Second Amendment is about how constitutional rights
building unfolds in the twenty-first century. It is a story about methodological
and jurisprudential design choices that shape doctrinal development in
fundamental ways.
Borrowing, and similar concepts that describe aspects of this
phenomenon, 10 “augment[] formal modalities of interpretation, such as those
arising from text, history, structure, precedent, or animating principles.” 11
Borrowing occurs whenever constitutional actors argue for importing elements
from one constitutional domain to another to justify a certain outcome or
treatment—“for example, appropriating notions of equality from equal
protection doctrine and applying them in a proceeding involving due process.” 12
Despite its ubiquity in Second Amendment doctrine and scholarship—and
its sometimes-decisive effect on individual cases—the scope of this borrowing
remains largely unexplored in the literature. Its role is especially important in
this context because the Second Amendment has come of age in an era where
constitutional rights and theorizing have garnered sustained academic, popular,
and judicial attention. 13 Doctrines for many other rights are already well
5. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Foreword: The Second Amendment as Ordinary Constitutional
Law, 81 TENN. L. REV. 407, 407 (2014) (“Now that the Supreme Court has nailed down the old
question of whether the Second Amendment protected any sort of right at all, the questions that arise
seem a lot like those addressed by courts in other constitutional contexts.”).
6. See infra Section I.B.
7. Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010).
8. TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE 17 (2018).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1309, 1313 (2017) (providing “a framework that courts can use to analyze claims involving
cumulative constitutional rights”); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748
(1999) (articulating a theory of interpretation in which “the interpreter tries to read a contested word
or phrase that appears in the Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the
same (or a very similar) word or phrase”).
11. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 7, at 466.
12. Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 466 (2012); see also Tebbe & Tsai, supra
note 7, at 462–63 (defining borrowing).
13. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 191, 192–93 (2008) (describing the cultural and legal milieu in which Heller arose and arguing
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established and robust. 14 Conceptual work on constitutional theory and
interpretive methodology is widespread and flourishing. 15 And, unlike the
gradual jurisprudential development of other fundamental rights, the Second
Amendment’s ascent has been quick and steep. 16
Borrowing in this space is not only important but also easily
understandable. Because the Second Amendment has only been recently
recognized as creating an enforceable individual right, there is a dearth of
federal legal precedent to rely on when fashioning rules to implement it. 17
Courts have turned, rather naturally, to how they understand and implement
other rights for guidance. 18 In fact, “the very structure of a common law
tradition dictates that, particularly where novel legal issues are raised,
borrowing will be a frequent feature of judicial reasoning.” 19
This Article is the first to systematically scrutinize, categorize, and assess
how Second Amendment borrowing works to build a constitutional right from
the ground up. It adds not just to the descriptive literature about what is
borrowed and when, but also to the normative discussion of how to understand
and assess the practice of borrowing. It traces both the sources from which
courts and commenters borrow and the ways in which they do so. It also
that the decision “respects claims and compromises forged in social movement conflict over the right
to bear arms in the decades after Brown v. Board of Education”).
14. See, e.g., Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L.
REV. 63, 81 (2020) (noting that borrowing occurs so prolifically “in part ‘to take advantage of
accumulated wisdom’ from better-developed areas of law” (quoting Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 7, at
467)).
15. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 30 (2018)
(discussing the competing frames of rights jurisprudence that have emerged over the last several
decades); see generally William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
1455 (2019) (discussing originalism’s answer to questions of constitutional interpretation).
16. See, e.g., Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the
Right To Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1439 (2017) (“[T]he right to keep and
bear arms is beginning to take shape—the decade since Heller has seen more than one thousand lower
court challenges testing the boundaries and strength of the right.”).
17. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller World, 39 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1617, 1623 (2012) (“Faced with harder cases, and with the fogginess of the Heller opinion,
these courts understandably have reached for a framework resembling the familiar ‘baggage’ picked up
by the First Amendment.”).
18. Of course, courts could have instead looked to how states interpreted their (sometimes very
similar) constitutional right-to-arms provisions. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State
Constitutional Law, 84 S. CALIF. L. REV. 323, 384 (2011) (“Because the McDonald court declined to
establish a standard of review for Second Amendment claims, it is not too late for the Supreme Court—
and other federal courts now faced with the daunting task of evaluating Second Amendment claims
with little guidance from the Court—to effectuate respect for state constitutional practice by adopting
something like a reasonableness standard.”); Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105
MICH. L. REV. 683, 686 (2007) (proposing a reasonableness review standard that is “informed by the
example of state constitutional law, where the individual right to bear arms is already well established”).
That is not, however, a direction courts have pursued.
19. Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and Convergence, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 670, 673 (2011).
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sketches a paradigm to assess constitutional borrowing as an act of analogical
reasoning dependent both on relevant similarities and the underlying value
theories of a constitutional entitlement. After all, as Robert Tsai observes, “we
can only truly understand the practice of borrowing from within a tradition, as
constitutional actors acting within a particular legal system and political
culture.” 20
In Second Amendment borrowing, the sources are many and varied. First
Amendment elements, for example, have frequently been imported into Second
Amendment analysis. 21 Justice Scalia invited this application in Heller when he
expressly drew on First Amendment principles to, among other things, reject a
free-standing “interest-balancing” approach to the Second Amendment. 22 Most
recently in oral arguments during New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of
New York, 23 Justice Sotomayor suggested that Heller directed courts to
“analogize this [gun regulation] to the First Amendment.” 24 Yet the sources also
extend well beyond that. Judges and scholars have linked the Second

20. Robert L. Tsai, Considerations of History and Purpose in Constitutional Borrowing, 28 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 517, 520 (2019).
21. Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 375, 379 (2009) [Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing] (remarking that “the First and Second
Amendments have often been considered close cousins”); see also Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut:
Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1278 (2009) [hereinafter
Miller, Guns as Smut] (“The Court in Heller sent unmistakable signals that the First and Second
Amendments are cousins and may be subject to similar limitations.”).
22. District of Columbia v. Heller (Heller I), 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“The First Amendment
contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for
obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and
wrongheaded views.”).
23. 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
24. Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (No. 18280).
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Amendment not only with the First 25 but also with the Fifth, 26 Seventh, 27 and
Fourteenth Amendments, 28 among others. 29
How Second Amendment borrowing works is more prosaic. In broad
contours, courts borrow either at the level of methodological framework or at
the level of substantive rules. 30 Many courts, for example, have relied on the
First Amendment’s coverage-protection framework in announcing a similar
two-step approach to Second Amendment cases. 31 This framework asks first
whether the conduct falls within the scope of the right and then applies a meansend test, like intermediate scrutiny, to see whether the conduct is protected. On
the level of substantive rules, some advocates have tried to convince judges to
borrow prior-restraint rules or restrictions on content-based regulations. 32
Some courts have employed other First Amendment rules, like the adequate
25. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that courts
have “begun to adapt First Amendment doctrine to the Second Amendment context”); Miller, Guns as
Smut, supra note 21, at 1278 (proposing that courts “[t]reat the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms for self-defense the same as the right to own and view adult obscenity under the First
Amendment”); Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and
“Government Buildings”, 92 NEB. L. REV. 537, 542 (2014) (“[T]his Article concludes that lessons from
First Amendment doctrine counsel in favor of a narrow interpretation of Heller’s schools and
government buildings.”); see generally Kenneth A. Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First
Amendment Rules: The Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment
Jurisprudence, 93 NEB. L. REV. 429 (2014) (discussing the application of First Amendment framework
to Second Amendment issues); David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment,
81 TENN. L. REV. 417 (2014) (documenting the use of First Amendment case law as a guide for Second
Amendment jurisprudence).
26. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Bans, 129 YALE L.J. 308, 317–18 (2019) [hereinafter Blocher, Bans]
(describing a similar type of inquiry in takings cases as the Court undertook in Heller).
27. See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can
Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 852 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Text, History, and
Tradition] (arguing that “courts could look to the Supreme Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence,
and in particular the Seventh Amendment’s ‘historical test,’ to help them devise a test for the Second”).
28. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and Passions: The Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights,
50 RUTGERS L. REV. 97, 99 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson, Principles and Passions] (arguing that there
exists a conceptual and analytical connection between the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms and the Fourteenth Amendment right to reproductive autonomy); Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami
of Legal Uncertainty: What’s a Court To Do Post-McDonald?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 489
(2012) (“[T]his Article proposes that Second Amendment cases should be reviewed under the test
utilized in abortion cases: the undue burden test.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism:
Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 248 (2008) (predicting that the development of Second
Amendment jurisprudence “will have close parallels to the development of the privacy right”).
29. The Third Amendment has even made a recent appearance. See Mark E. Coon, Penumbras
Reconsidered: Interpreting the Bill of Rights Through Intratextual Analysis with the Third Amendment, 43
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 45, 48 (2019) (using intratextual analysis to “interpret[] the Second and Fourth
Amendments in light of the Third Amendment”). Scholars argue that even nonconstitutional common
law and statutory principles should be borrowed to flesh out the Second Amendment. See Ruben, supra
note 14, at 81 (advocating borrowing from common-law self-defense principles).
30. See infra Section I.B.
31. See infra Section I.B.1.
32. See infra Section I.B.2.
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alternatives analysis. 33 The Second Circuit, for example, has held that, “[b]y
analogy” to free-speech doctrine, a “law that regulates the availability of
firearms is not a substantial burden on the right to keep and bear arms if
adequate alternatives remain for law-abiding citizens to acquire a firearm for
self-defense.” 34
As well as identifying these sources and types of borrowing, this Article
examines the ways in which courts and scholars seek to justify the practice. This
Article contends that borrowing is fundamentally a form of analogical
reasoning. 35 Just like in applying precedent, an act of borrowing is justified
when the target and the source share relevant similarities that warrant applying
a characteristic from the source to the target. 36 When the similarities are
superficial or nonexistent, an act of borrowing is not justified. 37 This Article
provokes the discussion of which features are most relevant to the Second
Amendment by isolating the (sometimes implicit) justifications for how courts
and commentators have sought to justify borrowing.
The importance of this question—and the confusion about when to borrow
and when to resist—is illustrated in Chief Justice Roberts’s own ambivalence
about the relevance of the First Amendment to the Second. During oral
argument in Heller, he asked Walter Dellinger, the District’s lawyer, how the
city’s ban on handgun possession could be considered reasonable. 38 When
Dellinger replied that the ban covered only one type of firearm, Roberts had a
quick retort: “So if you have a law that prohibits the possession of books, it’s all
right if you allow the possession of newspapers?” 39 If it was more than just

33. The adequate alternatives test looks to whether a regulation leaves open sufficient alternative
avenues for a person to still exercise the right at issue. Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality,
Public Carry, and Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 291 (2016). As discussed below,
Heller has been read by some courts and scholars to reject this type of test. See infra notes 120–21 and
accompanying text.
34. United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2012). The court upheld the conviction
of a man who transported a firearm from Florida to his New York home in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a)(3) because the man had “ample alternative means of acquiring firearms for self-defense
purposes.” Id.
35. See Laurin, supra note 19, at 703–04 (“Principles of legal reasoning and jurisprudential
legitimacy counsel that the use of analogy and precedent in judicial decisions be grounded in reasoning
that is by some measure a ‘fit’ with the matter before the Court. This imperative . . . is only enhanced
when a court draws from outside the immediate doctrinal domain in which a case dwells.” (footnotes
omitted)); LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 4
(2005) (“There is something distinctive about legal reasoning, which is its reliance on analogy.”).
36. See infra Section II.A, Part III.
37. See infra Section II.A, Part III.
38. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Heller I, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).
39. Id. at 18–19. Chief Justice Roberts’s retort even made its way into the opinion, translated back
into Second Amendment terms. See Heller I, 554 U.S. at 629 (“It is no answer to say, as petitioners do,
that it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e.,
long guns) is allowed.”).
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rhetorical, the Chief Justice’s question assumed that at least some principles
from First Amendment law are applicable in considering the Second. 40
But, just minutes later, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to reject the
methodology of First Amendment cases: the “standards that apply in the First
Amendment,” he insisted, “just kind of developed over the years as sort of
baggage that the First Amendment picked up.” 41 Thus, he thought there were
reasons to import First Amendment elements and, at the same time, reasons to
decline. Exploring this tension, and teasing out the justification for importing
some elements while rejecting others, is a central task of this Article.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the Second
Amendment’s relationships among its constitutional counterparts. This Article
is the first to undertake this critical taxonomical project for the Second
Amendment. Though other articles have analyzed a single borrowing
relationship, 42 none have surveyed the state of Second Amendment borrowing
as a whole. This part underscores how scholars and courts have searched to find
firm jurisprudential footholds as they navigate the development of a new and
unfamiliar doctrinal terrain. 43 It focuses on what is borrowed in Second
Amendment contexts and how.
Part II focuses on why that borrowing occurs, with implications for both
Second Amendment borrowing and the practice in constitutional law at large.
This part identifies the features of analogical reasoning that borrowing shares
and then proceeds to identify and develop the ways that courts and
commentators have sought to explain relevant similarities when borrowing. As
this part shows, borrowers have typically appealed to one of four different types
of similarities to justify the practice of borrowing: textual, historical, functional,
and structural. 44
Finally, Part III argues that current Second Amendment borrowing suffers
from two flaws. On the one hand, borrowing is often justified by saying why
the Second Amendment is similar to another right, but without specific
attention to which aspects of the other right’s jurisprudence warrant importing.
As we might ask the Chief Justice, even assuming similarities between the First
and Second Amendments, what supports rejecting tiers of scrutiny while
borrowing other First Amendment principles? The current practice thus
operates at too high a level.
40. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 18–19.
41. Id. at 44.
42. See generally, e.g., Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49 (2012) (chronicling how First Amendment elements get
borrowed in Second Amendment analyses).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (describing the task
of applying and expanding Heller to other contexts as “a vast terra incognita that courts should enter
only upon necessity and only then by small degree”).
44. See infra Section II.B.
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On the other hand, despite attention to the comparison between two
rights, focus on the broader theoretical rationales for the Second Amendment
is often missing. Yet understanding the core values that a right serves is crucial
for judging whether a particular act of borrowing is justified. Current practice
thus also aims too low.
These twin pitfalls in current borrowing practice threaten to leave Second
Amendment doctrine an untheorized collection of rules, standards, and
frameworks—all detached from a deeper justification. Only by taking corrective
steps to remedy these problems can Second Amendment borrowing achieve the
goal of creating a rich, theoretically justified, and coherent constitutional
jurisprudence.
I. THE VARIETIES OF SECOND AMENDMENT BORROWING
The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.” 45 It is, in many respects, a brand-new
fundamental right. 46 And for the past decade, this right has grown up in the
shadow of its elders. Section I.A begins by laying out what the Supreme Court
did in Heller, including how Justice Scalia’s majority opinion draws parallels
with established constitutional doctrine. Next, Section I.B traces the ways in
which courts and scholars have used other constitutional rights to answer the
questions Heller left open about the Second Amendment’s scope and strength.
A.

The (Re)Birth of a Right in Heller

Before Heller, the Supreme Court had not decided a Second Amendment
case since United States v. Miller, 47 nearly seventy years prior. 48 In Miller, the
Court upheld criminal indictments under the National Firearms Act of 1934
(“NFA”) 49 against a Second Amendment challenge. 50 In rejecting the challenge,
the Court held that the Second Amendment did not protect the use or
possession of a short-barrel shotgun because there was no evidence that that
weapon had “some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a

45. U.S. CONST. amend. II
46. See Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment: Why Heller Is
(Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 171 (2008) (remarking that “Heller
breathed new life into the Second Amendment”); see also Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a
Fundamental Right, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 621, 633–36 (2019) (cataloguing the ways the Second
Amendment fits in the family of “fundamental rights”).
47. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
48. Id. at 174.
49. Pub. L. No. 73-474, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.); Miller, 307 U.S. at 174.
50. Miller, 307 U.S. at 176.
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well regulated militia.” 51 Beyond preserving the NFA and identifying some
relation to the militia, the Court’s terse and opaque decision did not definitively
establish how courts should consider other Second Amendment cases. 52
In the ensuing decades, however, most lower courts read Miller to endorse
a militia-oriented reading 53 of the Second Amendment and thus rejected
arguments that the Constitution protects an individual right to keep and bear
arms unconnected to service in a state-organized militia. 54 In fact, until 2007,
no federal court had struck down state or federal legislation on Second
Amendment grounds. 55 But in that year, the D.C. Circuit held that the District
of Columbia’s ban on possession of functional handguns in the home violated
the Second Amendment. 56
When that case arrived at the Supreme Court, it had all the trappings of a
blockbuster. At the time, public opinion was strongly in favor of the “individual

51. Id. at 178.
52. See, e.g., Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
48, 49, 82 (2008) (discussing how Miller’s curious history may influence the debate over collectiveright versus individual-right views); Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of
Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 353 (2009) (commenting that Miller was seen as “an
opaque and open-ended opinion that left a great deal of ambiguity concerning the nature of its holding
and its conception of the Second Amendment right”).
53. Jason Racine, What the Hell(er)? The Fine Print Standard of Review Under Heller, 29 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 605, 605 (2009) (“Up until 2001, all of the federal circuit courts that had ruled on the
meaning interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting either a collective right that did not apply
to individuals or a sophisticated collective right that only applied individually to people linked to state
militias.”); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461,
466 (1995) (contrasting a collective-rights reading of the Amendment that vests the right in the state
militia with an individual-rights reading that protects a person’s right to keep and carry guns apart
from militia service).
54. See, e.g., Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 638 n.2 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Until the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Emerson, every Court of Appeals to consider the question had
understood Miller to hold that the Second Amendment does not protect the right to possess and use
guns for purely private, civilian purposes.” (citation omitted)); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124
(4th Cir. 1995) (“Since [Miller], the lower federal courts have uniformly held that the Second
Amendment preserves a collective, rather than individual, right.”); United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d
1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Before Heller, the scope of the Second Amendment was largely defined
by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Miller.” (citation omitted)). But see United States
v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the Second Amendment “protects
individual Americans in their right to keep and bear arms whether or not they are a member of a select
militia or performing active military service or training” and distinguishing Miller); Brannon P.
Denning, Can the Simple Cite Be Trusted?: Lower Court Interpretations of United States v. Miller and the
Second Amendment, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 961, 971 (1996) (collecting and criticizing lower courts’ reading
of Miller to deny an individual right to keep and bear arms).
55. In 1999, a federal district court in Texas struck down a federal prohibition, but the Fifth
Circuit reversed on appeal in Emerson. 270 F.3d at 264–65. The trial court in Miller had likewise
declared the NFA invalid, but the Supreme Court reversed that opinion too. See Miller, 307 U.S. at
174.
56. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude that the
Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms.”).

99 N.C. L. REV. 333 (2021)

2021]

CONSTRUCTING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

343

right” view, 57 and the District of Columbia’s effective ban on the possession of
an operable handgun in the home was one of the most stringent gun regulations
in the country. 58 In the course of striking down the District of Columbia’s ban,
the Supreme Court invoked the Second Amendment’s constitutional relatives
both to decipher the meaning of the provision and to sketch a framework for
applying it. 59
The Court first drew on other rights domains to draw out the meaning of
the text. It invoked the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments when
considering how “the people” should be construed in the Second Amendment,
opting for a consistent, individual-focused usage across amendments. 60 The
majority then relied on its general rights jurisprudence to reject the notion that
only those “arms” that existed in 1791 are protected: “[j]ust as the First
Amendment protects modern forms of communications, and the Fourth
Amendment applies to modern forms of search, the Second Amendment
extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms . . . .” 61
With that interpretive task complete, the Court used its construction of
other constitutional rights to determine how to apply the Second
Amendment. 62 The Court was quick, for instance, to note that the individual
right it recognized “was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of
free speech was not.” 63 Emphasizing that connection, the Court reiterated that
all rights have limits: “[W]e do not read the Second Amendment to protect the
right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not
57. Before Heller, the competing views were the “collective rights” view that saw the Second
Amendment as protecting the rights of states or the right to form a militia and the “individual rights”
view that saw the right as a personal one. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s
Future in the Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 406, 406 (2008) (“What Heller is most
notable for is its complete and unanimous rejection of the ‘collective rights’ interpretation that for
nearly seventy years held sway with pundits, academics, and—most significantly—lower courts.”); see
also id. at 411 n.28 (citing a study that seventy-three percent of the American public believes the
Constitution guarantees the rights of Americans to own guns).
58. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 629 (“Few laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe
restriction of the District’s handgun ban.”); Linda Greenhouse, Justices To Decide on Right To Keep
Handgun, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/us/21scotus.html
[https://perma.cc/E5KM-8NXQ (dark archive)] (“Of the hundreds of gun regulations on the books in
states and localities around the country, the district’s ordinance is generally regarded as the strictest.”).
59. Cf. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (discussing
the difference between discerning meaning and creating a doctrinal framework for a constitutional
provision).
60. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 579.
61. Id. at 582 (citations omitted); see also Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1031 (2016)
(Alito, J., concurring) (“Electronic stun guns are no more exempt from the Second Amendment’s
protections, simply because they were unknown to the First Congress, than electronic communications
are exempt from the First Amendment, or electronic imaging devices are exempt from the Fourth
Amendment.”).
62. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 595.
63. Id.
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read the First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any
purpose.” 64 The Court, however, rejected the invitation to pick from “any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,”
though it clarified that rational-basis review was off the table. 65
As well as rejecting rational basis, the Court also suggested that the
government may not ban a weapon if it is in common use for lawful purposes,
no matter whether other weapons remain available for self-defense. 66 The Court
also rejected Justice Breyer’s call for an interest-balancing approach. 67 In doing
so, Justice Scalia specifically invoked the Court’s historic treatment of “other
enumerated constitutional right[s],” 68 including the First Amendment:
We would not apply an “interest-balancing” approach to the prohibition
of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. The First Amendment
contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which
included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets,
but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong headed
views. The Second Amendment is no different. Like the First, it is the
very product of an interest balancing by the people. 69
And, finally, in defending its refusal to adopt or apply any particular
standard for adjudicating Second Amendment claims, the Court relied again on
how it treated other rights: “[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first indepth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to
clarify the entire field, any more than Reynolds v. United States, our first in-depth
Free Exercise Clause case, left that area in a state of utter certainty.” 70

64. Id.
65. Id. at 628–29. The Court noted that rational basis is the bare proscription of irrational laws
and “[o]bviously” cannot be “the same test . . . used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may
regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double
jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 628 n.27; see also United States
v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Heller left open the level of scrutiny applicable to
review a law that burdens conduct protected under the Second Amendment, other than to indicate that
rational-basis review would not apply in this context.”).
66. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 629 (“It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to
ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.
It is enough to note, as we have observed, that the American people have considered the handgun to
be the quintessential self-defense weapon.”). It is not entirely clear why this was “enough to
note.” Handguns, after all, were not the quintessential self-defense weapon chosen by the
Founders Jacob D. Charles, Heller and the Vagaries of History, SECOND THOUGHTS (Sept.
16, 2019), https://sites.law.duke.edu/secondthoughts/2019/09/16/heller-and-the-vagaries-of-history/
[https://perma.cc/3YZM-VLYD] (suggesting that the quintessential self-defense weapon should
receive greater protection than other common-use weapons).
67. Heller I, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
68. Id. at 634.
69. Id. at 635 (citation omitted).
70. Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879)).
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Heller thus teemed with comparisons to the other protections in the Bill
of Rights. It relied on the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments to decipher
meaning, again on free-speech principles to set up (and reject) decisional rules,
and on the free-exercise clause to justify a refusal to settle all (or, indeed, many)
debates about the Amendment. 71 Heller, in short, invited the doctrinal
borrowing that courts and scholars set out to develop. 72 At the same time, Heller
left gaping holes in the fabric of the constitutional right, forcing courts to
quickly find ways to deal with the litigation deluge. 73 The next section
catalogues the approaches these courts and commentators have taken.
B.

The Types and Sources of Second Amendment Borrowing

Though it announced an individual right with some broad qualifications,
Heller did not give judges much help as the next round of challenges bubbled
up through the lower courts. 74 This lack of guidance frustrated judges charged
with implementing the right 75—and simultaneously invigorated scholarship. 76
Both courts and commentators, however, understood they were not painting on
a blank canvas. 77 Though no Second Amendment guideposts existed, the
71. Id. at 579.
72. See id.
73. See Ruben & Blocher, supra note 16, at 1435 (noting that there have been more than one
thousand Second Amendment challenges arising in the decade after Heller).
74. See, e.g., Sobel, supra note 28, at 523 (noting that the Supreme Court “fail[ed] to provide any
real guidance to the lower courts”).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 676 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that although
Heller staked out presumptively lawful regulations, it “did not explain why the listed regulations are
presumptively lawful”).
76. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Administering the Second Amendment: Law, Politics, and Taxonomy,
50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1263, 1263–64 (2010) (providing a framework for reviewing Second
Amendment challenges); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1445 (2009) (offering an
approach for “how should courts translate this right into workable constitutional doctrine”); cf. also
Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the Second Amendment, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 131, 133 (2008) (discussing “the most plausible interests in private arms
possession that might stand behind the Second Amendment”).
77. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller and the Abortion
Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons, and the Attitudinalist Critique, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1285,
1286 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson, Supply Restrictions] (“We are not working on a blank slate. It is a
common problem that protected rights are exercised in a variety of ways, employing different
methodologies and technologies that raise distinct constitutional questions.”); Miller, Guns as Smut,
supra note 21, at 1303 (seeking to “locate[] the Second Amendment within an existing individual rights
architecture”); Reynolds & Denning, supra note 57, at 406 (“Given the fact that the Heller majority
declined to give a detailed accounting of the proper standard of review to be used in subsequent Second
Amendment cases, litigants have a rare opportunity to write on a tabula much more rasa than is
ordinarily the case in constitutional litigation, making use of recent scholarship on the crafting of
constitutional decision rules that implement constitutional provisions.”); Eugene Volokh, The First and
Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97, 97 (2009) (“Analogies between the First
Amendment and the Second (and comparable state constitutional protections) are over 200 years
old.”).
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modern era of rights jurisprudence provides a rich array of interpretive tools
with which to approach the question. 78 Scholars and judges imported these tools
into Second Amendment analysis, adapting them to fit the circumstances. This
section explores what sources these actors used to operationalize the right to
keep and bear arms and under which theories they did so. It starts by looking
at borrowing at the methodological level before turning to the borrowing of
substantive rules. 79
1. Borrowing a Methodological Framework
There are at least three sources from which judges and academics have
borrowed to build a structure within which to assess Second Amendment
claims: (1) the First Amendment’s free-speech framework, 80 (2) the Seventh
Amendment’s historical test, 81 and (3) abortion jurisprudence’s undue-burden
standard. 82
By far the most frequent loaner in the Second Amendment context is First
Amendment analysis. 83 Right after Heller, courts and commentators quickly
began applying a two-step framework that was explicitly borrowed from the
Court’s First Amendment law. 84 First, courts consider whether a type of
conduct falls within the scope of the Second Amendment. Second, assuming it
does, courts apply a type of means-end scrutiny drawn from the traditional tiers

78. Of course, turning to borrowing from other federal constitutional rights domains was not
inevitable. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing state constitutional practice).
79. One point of clarification: this section uses a distinction between methodological borrowing
and substantive borrowing simply for organizational simplicity—the difference is less a dichotomy than
a continuum. See Matthew D. Adler, Can Constitutional Borrowing Be Justified? A Comment on Tushnet, 1
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350, 351 (1998) (explaining, in the context of constitutional borrowing across
countries, that the object of borrowing “could be any part, large or small, of the constitutional regime”—
from a single sentence to an entire article); Joseph Blocher & Luke Morgan, Doctrinal Dynamism,
Borrowing, and the Relationship Between Rules and Rights, 28 WM & MARY BILL RTS J. 319, 323–24
(2020) (discussing how borrowing within U.S. constitutional law can occur with “both the more specific
rules and the broader methodologies” of constitutional doctrine). Some elements fall clearly on the
methodological side, like using one of the tiers of scrutiny to assess the right; others are clearly on the
substantive side, like urging adoption of the prior-restraint doctrine. But many are in between. Nothing
hinges on where these elements are classified in the following sections, and the reader is free to disagree
with some of these choices without upsetting the broader project.
80. See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 91–98 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 99–110 and accompanying text.
83. Magarian, supra note 42, at 61 (“The most common sort of doctrinal analogy from the First
Amendment to the Second seeks to import a First Amendment standard of review into Second
Amendment law.”).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (relying on First
Amendment precedent to announce the framework).
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of scrutiny that are ordinarily used in First Amendment analysis to determine
constitutionality. 85
Courts emphasize that this two-step coverage-protection inquiry is drawn
from longstanding First Amendment jurisprudence. 86 As the Third Circuit said
when adopting the framework, “Heller itself repeatedly invokes the First
Amendment in establishing principles governing the Second Amendment. We
think this implies the structure of First Amendment doctrine should inform our
analysis of the Second Amendment.” 87 Other courts and commentators have
been just as explicit that the connection between the Amendments leads to
borrowing. The Fifth Circuit said, after surveying other circuit-court practice,
that it was “persuaded to adopt the two-step framework outlined above because
First Amendment doctrine informs it.” 88
Others, however, have sought to import the analytical framework from
different rights. For example, soon after Heller, and despite the avalanche of
circuit courts adopting the First Amendment-inspired two-step framework, a
set of judges and scholars began arguing for a textual-historical approach. 89 No
circuit court has yet adopted this test, and every circuit court to consider the
question has instead adopted the two-part test. 90 But, should courts incorporate
such an inquiry, Darrell Miller has argued that this decision can be grounded in
85. Means-end scrutiny requires the government to prove that the law serves the interests the
government seeks to advance. How substantially the law has to serve those interests, and how important
those interests must be, is a function of whichever tier of scrutiny—rational basis, intermediate
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny—the court selects. See id. (explaining means-end scrutiny framework).
86. See Blocher, Bans, supra note 26, at 319–20 (discussing the coverage-protection framework).
87. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 n.4 (citations omitted); see also Nelson Lund, The Second
Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1376 (2009) (arguing that
“[t]he case law dealing with free speech and the free exercise of religion provides a particularly good
analogue” for determining how to review Second Amendment challenges); Mark Tushnet, Permissible
Gun Regulations After Heller: Speculations About Method and Outcomes, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1426
(2009) (predicting, correctly, that “the lower courts will deal with gun regulation by subjecting it to a
standard-of-review analysis rather than an originalist, or traditionalist, analysis[ and] that they will
circle around a standard of review akin to either rational basis with bite or intermediate scrutiny”).
88. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700
F.3d 185, 197 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
89. See Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 394 (5th Cir. 2018) (Elrod, J., dissenting from the denial
of rehearing en banc) (advocating for a text, history, and tradition approach); Houston v. City of New
Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 682 F.3d 361 (5th
Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting) (“As several of our sister circuits have recognized, Heller and
McDonald dictate that the scope of the Second Amendment be defined solely by reference to its text,
history, and tradition.”); Mai v. United States, 974 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2020) (Bumatay, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“If operating on a clean slate, I would hew to Heller’s and
McDonald’s fidelity to the Second Amendment’s history, tradition, and text.”); Heller v. District of
Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (advocating
for the text, history, and tradition approach).
90. See Mance, 896 F.3d at 391 (Higginson, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc)
(explaining that “the panel applied the two-step analytic framework adopted by our circuit and all nine
other circuits to have considered the issue”).
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Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. 91 He is explicit in his aim: “[t]o the extent
that the [Heller] Court is serious about rejecting balancing and embracing
history, ‘borrowing’ from the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence can
provide clues about how courts may craft a history-centered test for the Second
Amendment.” 92 Taking seriously Heller’s demand, Miller describes the Court’s
Seventh Amendment historical test as an apt framework. 93 That historical test
works in a two-step fashion, where history serves first as “a familiar boundarysetting device” and then “serves a tailoring function,” in which it “dictates the
extent to which legislatures or courts may alter both the form and the function
of the jury that the Seventh Amendment guarantees.” 94
Justice Kavanaugh and the other circuit dissenters take a different
approach to the historical test they propose. In their view, a historical analogue
to some regulation is not only sufficient but also necessary to uphold the law,
not—à la Miller—merely sufficient. 95 As then-Judge Kavanaugh explained:
“Gun bans and gun regulations that are longstanding—or, put another way,
sufficiently rooted in text, history, and tradition—are consistent with the
Second Amendment individual right.” 96 But those “that are not longstanding
or sufficiently rooted in text, history, and tradition are not consistent with the
Second Amendment individual right.” 97 The other dissenters agree that,
without historical precedent, novel or innovative regulations fail. 98

91. See generally Miller, Text, History, and Tradition, supra note 27 (advocating a historical
approach).
92. Id. at 858 (footnote omitted); id. at 888 (remarking that “the Seventh Amendment test may
serve as a model from which to construct a durable but flexible Second Amendment test reliant on text,
history, tradition, and the common law”); see also id. at 907 (“The Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms could be implemented through a historical test based on historical materials and common
law reasoning and sources, just as the Seventh Amendment right has been.”).
93. Id. at 875.
94. Id. at 887. For example, Miller applies the test to a ban on high-capacity magazines. First, the
challenger would have to show that such magazines are a protected arm, which they might do by arguing
that it “is sufficiently analogous to such a weapon that a reasonable person would have understood it
to be” one at the Founding. If she did this at step one, the government would have to show that the
law is not a complete destruction of the right. It could do so by resorting to historical, precedential, or
functional considerations. Id. at 926–28.
95. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Mance v. Sessions, 896 F.3d 390, 395–96 n.3 (5th Cir. 2018) (Elrod, J., dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that if the regulations are not longstanding or sufficiently rooted
in history then, “under a proper text-and-history-based approach, such regulations would be
inconsistent with the Second Amendment’s individual right”). Not all those opposed to stricter gun
regulation, however, are in favor of a text, history, and tradition approach. See, e.g., Nelson R. Lund,
The Proper Role of History and Tradition in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 30 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 171, 174 (2020) (arguing that “then-Judge Kavanaugh misinterpreted Heller” and contending
neither Justice Kavanaugh “nor other members of the Supreme Court should adopt the approach that
he mistakenly imputed to Heller”).
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In addition to First and Seventh Amendment borrowing, scholars have
also sought to import the methodology of the Court’s reproductive-autonomy
jurisprudence into the developing right to keep and bear arms. 99 Stacey Sobel,
for example, argues that the undue-burden test—which forbids laws that have
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the way of an abortion—
best implements the Heller right because it “protects the core right, while
acknowledging that some regulation is necessary.” 100 Just as government
regulations that pose a “substantial obstacle” to a woman’s reproductive
decisions are unconstitutional, so too would be government regulations that
“impose[] a substantial obstacle on an individual’s core Second Amendment
right” to self-defense. 101 Melanie Kalmanson also argues that “borrowing” from
the Court’s abortion jurisprudence “will provide uniformity and consistency
within the case law.” 102 Jessica Lujan applies the undue-burden test to
hypothetical smart gun regulations, contending that “a ‘smart gun’ mandate
would likely fail to pass constitutional muster under a Casey-like ‘undue burden’
analysis” because of the expense and unreliability of current technology. 103
For the most part, courts have declined the invitation to import the undueburden test into the Second Amendment. For example, in assessing a challenge
to a Chicago ordinance that prohibited gun ranges within city limits, the
Seventh Circuit stated that although “[t]he City urges us to import the ‘undue
burden’ test from the Court’s abortion cases,” 104 “[b]oth Heller and McDonald
suggest that First Amendment analogues are more appropriate.” 105 A federal
99. Sobel, supra note 28, at 491 (proposing that courts use the undue-burden standard); see also
Johnson, Supply Restrictions, supra note 77, at 1286 (arguing that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence is
“uniquely-suited for building foundation on which to build a standard for resolving the assault weapons
question” because it balances rights and harm in the appropriate way). See generally Johnson, Principles
and Passions, supra note 28 (arguing that the right to an abortion and the right to bear arms share similar
theoretical foundations). Others have drawn another analogy between abortion and gun rights, though
not in the mold of a borrowing methodology. Judge Wilkinson has argued that the Court’s decisions
in Roe and Heller both amount to judicial activism that overturns the will of the electorate on the basis
of vague or unclear constitutional text. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the
Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009) (arguing that Heller is inconsistent with
conservative judicial philosophy).
100. Sobel, supra note 28, at 517. Alan Brownstein argues that the undue-burden framework is
actually more deeply entrenched in how courts determine whether a right has been infringed more
broadly. Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional
Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 867–72 (1994). As he argues, “the ‘undue burden’ standard of the
Casey plurality is reflected in one form or another throughout the fundamental rights case law of the
past forty years.” Id. at 872.
101. Sobel, supra note 28, at 522.
102. Melanie Kalmanson, The Second Amendment Burden: Arming Courts with a Workable Standard
for Reviewing Gun Safety Legislation, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 347, 374–75 (2016).
103. Jessica M. Lujan, Half-Cocked: “Smart Gun” Mandates Are Premature and Unconstitutional Under
the Prevailing “Undue Burden” Test, 24 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 500, 520 (2018).
104. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706 (7th Cir. 2011).
105. Id.
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district court in Atlanta similarly rejected the use of the undue-burden standard,
remarking that it “is best left to the abortion cases from which it stemmed.” 106
The district court in a later challenge to a District of Columbia law followed
suit: “[T]his court strongly doubts that the Heller majority envisioned the undue
burden standard when it left for another day a determination of the level of
scrutiny to be applied to firearms laws.” 107
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, has suggested that just as the undueburden test permits a ban on one type of abortion procedure because others are
available, 108 so also “when deciding whether a restriction on gun sales
substantially burdens Second Amendment rights, we should ask whether the
restriction leaves law-abiding citizens with reasonable alternative means for
obtaining firearms sufficient for self-defense purposes.” 109 But the Ninth
Circuit has not imported the undue-burden framework wholesale and appears
to have consistently applied the two-step framework borrowed from the First
Amendment instead. 110
2. Borrowing Substantive Law
Methodological borrowing is not all that controversial. 111 But some courts,
scholars, and advocates have also sought to import substantive rules of law—
most notably from the First Amendment—into the Second Amendment as well.
Many of these attempts have been met with skepticism. In the course of
commenting on the prevalence of borrowing from the First Amendment, one
federal court expressed a characteristic sentiment: “While these cases borrow an
analytical framework, they do not apply substantive First Amendment rules in the

106. GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 212 F. Supp. 3d 1348, 1367 n.16 (N.D.
Ga. 2016).
107. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 698 F. Supp. 2d 179, 187 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
108. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164 (2007) (“The conclusion that the Act does not impose
an undue burden is supported by other considerations. Alternatives are available to the prohibited
procedure.”).
109. Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir.
2012). A few other California courts have hinted in this direction. See, e.g., Teixeira v. County of
Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 680 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that “gun buyers have no right to have a gun store
in a particular location, at least as long as their access is not meaningfully constrained” and citing
privacy-based undue-burden case law to bolster the point); People v. Flores, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 804, 809
n.5 (2008) (upholding conviction for carrying a concealed firearm in public and noting that “it appears
that a mid-level standard of scrutiny analogous to the ‘undue burden’ standard will ultimately prevail
in this context” (citation omitted)).
110. United States v. Torres, 911 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing the circuit’s use of
the “two-step inquiry to analyze claims that a law violates the Second Amendment”).
111. But see Magarian, supra note 42, at 61 (arguing that the First Amendment is not a proper
analogue for importing the tiers of scrutiny); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing for a text, history, and tradition approach).
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Second Amendment context.” 112 The Third Circuit even explained its prior
reference to importing the First Amendment’s “structure” as merely
“reflect[ing] this Court’s willingness to consider the varying levels of meansend scrutiny applied to First Amendment challenges when determining what
level of scrutiny to apply to a Second Amendment challenge.” 113 It did not
demand that the court “import the prior restraint doctrine” or “the First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine to the Second Amendment context.” 114
Yet substantive rules have crept in, nonetheless. For example, the First
Amendment generally permits reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
on protected speech, so long as those restrictions “leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.” 115 The Second Circuit was one
of the first courts to employ in the Second Amendment context an alternatives
analysis expressly borrowed from the First Amendment. 116 “By analogy” with
free-speech doctrine, the Second Circuit said, “[A] law that regulates the
availability of firearms is not a substantial burden on the right to keep and bear
arms if adequate alternatives remain for law-abiding citizens to acquire a firearm
for self-defense.” 117 Other courts have used this same notion, often upholding
bans on certain semi-automatic weapons or high-capacity magazines in part by
appeal to this principle. 118
But despite its prevalence among courts and commentators, Heller itself
arguably made this connection tenuous when it rejected the argument that the

112. Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 267 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Kachalsky
v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
113. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3d Cir. 2013).
114. Id.
115. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
116. See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Nordyke v. King,
644 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 2011) (analogizing from the First Amendment and concluding that “when
deciding whether a restriction on gun sales substantially burdens Second Amendment rights, we should
ask whether the restriction leaves law-abiding citizens with reasonable alternative means for obtaining
firearms sufficient for self-defense purposes”), aff’d en banc, 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012).
117. Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168. The court upheld the conviction of a man who transported a firearm
from Florida to his New York home in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) because the man had “ample
alternative means of acquiring firearms for self-defense purposes.” Id.
118. Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a
“prohibition of semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines” because it “does not effectively
disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend themselves” but leaves open adequate
alternatives for self-defense); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 260 (2d Cir.
2015) (“[C]itizens may continue to arm themselves with non-semiautomatic weapons or with any
semiautomatic gun that does not contain any of the enumerated military-style features. Similarly, while
citizens may not acquire high-capacity magazines, they can purchase any number of magazines with a
capacity of ten or fewer rounds.”); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.
2015) (concluding that rather than tiers of scrutiny, “we think it better to ask whether a regulation bans
weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, and whether law-abiding citizens retain
adequate means of self-defense” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

99 N.C. L. REV. 333 (2021)

352

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

District of Columbia’s ban left open adequate alternative weapons to use for
self-defense. 119 Some judges 120 and scholars 121 have indeed read Heller to
foreclose an alternatives analysis akin to that employed in First Amendment
cases. 122 This is likely one battlefield on which future Second Amendment
challenges will take place, though there is a strong argument that Heller only
foreclosed an alternatives analysis in the context of a handgun ban.
Similarly, scholars and advocates have invoked a large variety of
substantive First Amendment doctrines in an attempt to import these ideas into
the Second, but they have not always been successful in persuading courts.
These include
•
•
•

prior-restraint principles, 123
overbreadth doctrine, 124
forum analysis, 125

119. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) (“It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is
permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long
guns) is allowed.”).
120. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The question under Heller is not whether citizens have adequate
alternatives available for self-defense.”); Ass’n of N.J. Rifle and Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of N.J.,
910 F.3d 106, 129 (3d Cir. 2018) (Bibas, J., dissenting) (“[L]ooking to smaller magazines and other
options is the same argument, adapted to magazines, that the Court dismissed in Heller.”); Kolbe v.
Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 161–62 (4th Cir. 2017) (Traxler, J., dissenting) (arguing that an alternatives
analysis was “expressly rejected” by Heller (emphasis omitted)).
121. See, e.g., Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing, supra note 21, at 407 (stating that “the majority
in Heller disclaimed any Second Amendment version of the First Amendment’s time, place, and
manner test” that assesses whether alternatives are left open to accomplish the constitutionally
protected aim).
122. But see Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc., 910 F.3d at 118 n.20 (distinguishing Heller’s
discussion of this point on the ground that “the handgun ban at issue in Heller, which forbade an entire
class of firearms, differs from the [large-capacity magazine] ban here, which does not prevent lawabiding citizens from using any type of firearm”); N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 804 F.3d at 260 n.98
(giving the same reasoning and concluding that “[o]ur consideration of available alternatives for selfdefense thus squares with Heller’s focus on protecting that ‘core lawful purpose’ of the Second
Amendment right”).
123. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e reject Appellants’ invitation to apply
First Amendment prior restraint doctrine rather than traditional means-end scrutiny.”); Bolton v.
Bryant, 71 F. Supp. 3d 802, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“Analogizing to the First Amendment for the
purposes of determining the level of scrutiny required to review Second Amendment challenges is not
nearly enough to suggest that the prior restraint doctrine should be wholly imported into the Second
Amendment.”).
124. United States v. Chester, 514 F. App’x 393, 395 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[N]o circuit has accepted
an overbreadth challenge in the Second Amendment context.”); United States v. Decastro 682 F.3d
160, 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (“There is no overbreadth argument that Decastro can make in the Second
Amendment context.”).
125. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1135 (10th Cir. 2015) (Tymkovich, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (pointing to First Amendment forum analysis in observing “[t]hat
location matters to a scrutiny analysis is a familiar part of other areas of constitutional analysis”);
GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 212 F. Supp. 3d 1348, 1369 n.17 (N.D. Ga.
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fee jurisprudence, 126 and
retaliation doctrine. 127

Drawing even more deeply on First Amendment analogies, some scholars
have argued that courts should treat guns (or certain types of gun) like obscenity
and restrict their use to the home. 128 Or that courts should at least “rely on local
standards to make that distinction [between protected and unprotected arms],
just as First Amendment doctrine does when separating obscenity from
protected speech.” 129 Or, further still, that “courts should decide which gun
regulations deserve constitutional protection by adopting the high-, low-, and
no-value framework from the First Amendment’s free speech doctrine.” 130 The
examples could be multiplied.

2016) (“The Court is aware of no authority incorporating the First Amendment’s ‘public forum’
doctrine into Second Amendment jurisprudence, and declines to be the first court to make that leap.”);
see also Klukowski, supra note 25, at 462 (arguing for a Second Amendment forum analysis); Pratt, supra
note 25, at 574 (arguing “that lessons from First Amendment student-speech jurisprudence and publicforum doctrine caution against expansive interpretations of Heller’s listed sensitive places”).
126. Bauer v. Becerra, 858 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that the plaintiff “urges us to
apply the line of ‘fee jurisprudence’ that was developed by the Supreme Court in the First Amendment
context to assess the constitutionality of fees imposed on the exercise of” his Second Amendment
rights) cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 982 (2018); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We
agree that the Supreme Court’s First Amendment fee jurisprudence provides the appropriate
foundation for addressing plaintiffs’ fee claims under the Second Amendment.”); see also Hannah E.
Shearer & Allison S. Anderman, Analyzing Gun-Violence-Prevention Taxes Under Emerging Firearm Fee
Jurisprudence, 43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 157, 160 (2018) (arguing that “it is misguided to import First
Amendment fee jurisprudence without modification into the very different context of gun-violenceprevention taxes”).
127. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cassia County, No. 17-CV-00256, 2019 WL 938385, at *8 (D. Idaho Feb.
26, 2019) (stating, in the context of a Second Amendment retaliation claim, “[T]he Court finds that
drawing from, and adapting, the Ninth Circuit’s approach to First Amendment retaliation claims is
appropriate here”), adhered to on reconsideration, 2019 WL 5270200 (D. Idaho Oct. 17, 2019).
128. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Does Heller Protect a Right To Carry Guns Outside the Home?, 59
SYRACUSE L. REV. 225, 231 (2008) (“Like the Second Amendment, nothing in the text of the First
Amendment suggests that its protections would have any greater force in the home than outside it.
Nonetheless, in Stanley the Court held that home possession of obscene materials could not be
criminalized, even as it assumed arguendo that public display and distribution of obscenity were
unprotected.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Miller, Guns as Smut, supra note 21, at 1280 (arguing
that the Second Amendment can be construed similarly as the First in some respects); Jordan E. Pratt,
Uncommon Firearms as Obscenity, 81 TENN. L. REV. 633, 640 (2014) (“[T]his Article proposes that
obscenity law, in particular, can offer important insights for mapping out the general constitutional
boundaries of the modern debate over gun-type restrictions.”).
129. Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 90 (2013).
130. Joseph E. Sitzmann, High-Value, Low-Value, and No-Value Guns: Applying Free Speech Law to
the Second Amendment, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1981, 1985 (2019); see also id. at 1993–94 (“Drawing on the
theme of comparing Second Amendment cases to First Amendment doctrine, the sections that follow
expand one plausible and useful analogy: like obscene ‘speech,’ which garners no constitutional
protection, certain guns—no-value guns—deserve no constitutional protection. By contrast, so-called
low-value guns merit some constitutional protection, while high-value guns deserve the most rigorous
constitutional protection.” (footnote omitted)).
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Although many of these courts and scholars have provided justifications
for the borrowing they propose, one judge put the criticism spurred by these
innovations succinctly:
[Heller’s] limited references are hardly an invitation to import the First
Amendment’s idiosyncratic doctrines wholesale into a Second
Amendment context, where, without a link to expressive conduct, they
will often appear unjustified. To the extent some commentators and
courts, frustrated with Heller’s lack of guidance, have clung to these
references and attempted to force unwieldy First Amendment analogies,
they muddle, rather than clarify, analysis. 131
As these examples show, the First Amendment is a major source for
borrowing doctrine. But other rights have also provided doctrine to Second
Amendment cases. For instance, some courts have adopted the Fourth
Amendment’s definition of “the people” protected from unreasonable searches
and seizures to understand the scope of Second Amendment protections. 132
Heller itself hinted at that conclusion, 133 though other courts have resisted it. 134
Some scholars have even suggested that the Third Amendment’s ban on
quartering soldiers can be used to show why the Second Amendment’s right
must be individual and not collective. 135
*

*

*

As this part showed, borrowing is pervasive and wide-ranging. Those
courts and commentators trying to make sense of the Second Amendment have,
since the beginning, turned to methodological and doctrinal elements from
established constitutional domains. The next part analyzes what they have said
to justify the practice.
131. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 687 (4th Cir. 2010) (Davis, J., concurring in the
judgment).
132. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Heller noted the
similarities between the Second Amendment and the First and Fourth Amendments, implying that the
phrase ‘the people’ (which occurs in all three) has the same meaning in all three provisions. . . . An
interpretation of the Second Amendment as consistent with the other amendments passed as part of
the Bill of Rights has the advantage of treating identical phrasing in the same way and respecting the
fact that the first ten amendments were adopted as a package.”).
133. See Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 579 (2008) (“The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights
use the phrase ‘right of the people’ two other times, in the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition
Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause.”).
134. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440–41 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e do not find
that the use of ‘the people’ in both the Second and the Fourth Amendment mandates a holding that
the two amendments cover exactly the same groups of people. The purposes of the Second and the
Fourth Amendment are different.”).
135. Coon, supra note 29, at 66 (arguing that “if the Third Amendment protects individual citizens
from oppression at the hands of all Soldiers, including those in the Militia, it is nonsensical to conclude
the Second Amendment serves to arm the very organization that the Third Amendment protects
against”).
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II. JUSTIFYING BORROWING
Part I described the content of borrowing: what gets borrowed and how.
This part focuses on why. Why does a court think it justifiable to borrow the
First Amendment’s tiers-of-scrutiny analysis 136 and reject the Fourteenth
Amendment’s undue-burden standard? 137 How can one critique an effort to
import the First Amendment’s ban on content-based regulations 138 or prior
restraints 139 and justify importing the First Amendment’s tolerance for
restrictive regulations so long as they leave open ample alternative means for
exercising the right? 140
This part develops a framework for understanding and evaluating such acts
of borrowing. Section II.A explains how borrowing is a type of analogical
reasoning and what that means for how we analyze its use. Section II.B then
describes four types of reasons courts and commentators use to justify acts of
borrowing in the Second Amendment context: textual, historical, functional,
and structural.
A.

Borrowing and Analogical Reasoning

The great variety of borrowing chronicled in Part I is understandable.
When grappling with a new right, courts look to familiar jurisprudence for help.
In doing so, they turn not only to familiar rights but also to familiar ways of
reasoning. They reason analogically. As David Strauss has persuasively argued,
constitutional interpretation in the American tradition takes place through an
evolutionary, common law method. 141 Borrowing is a part of the broader
interpretive methodology through which the law gradually develops as courts
and commentators draw analogies with existing legal doctrine.
This section explains how constitutional actors are reasoning analogically
when they borrow, just as when they argue that Case A does or does not support
a certain outcome in Case B. If that is right, then we should be able to assess
borrowing using the same tools that we use to justify and critique the claim that
a certain case stands as precedent for the one under consideration. This section
lays out the argument for treating borrowing as a type of analogical reasoning,
136. See supra notes 83–88 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 99–110 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., GeorgiaCarry.org Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 212 F. Supp. 3d 1348, 1368
(N.D. Ga. 2016) (“The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ contention that strict scrutiny should apply because
the Firearms Regulation is a ‘content-based’ regulation.”).
139. See, e.g., Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 435 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Appellants contend that we should
apply the First Amendment prior restraint doctrine because application of the Handgun Permit Law’s
‘justifiable need’ standard vests licensing officials with ‘unbridled discretion.’”).
140. See supra note 33–34 and accompanying text.
141. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 885
(1996) (arguing that American constitutional development occurs through a gradual, common-law-like
process).
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and the next section fleshes out what that looks like in the Second Amendment
context.
Analogical reasoning is often described as a uniquely pervasive form of
legal reasoning, 142 if not the very embodiment of legal reasoning itself. 143 Its use
is most often associated with the identification and application of precedent to
a new case. Martin Golding explains the essential form of an argument by
analogy:
(i) x has characteristics F, G, ...
(ii) y has characteristics F, G, ...
(iii) x also has characteristic H, ...
(iv) F, G, ..., are H-relevant characteristics.
(v) Therefore, unless there are countervailing considerations, y has
characteristic H. 144
We reason like this naturally in everyday life. I let my lawn mower sit for
a while after multiple attempts to start it fail because I know that tactic has
worked in the past when I have flooded the engine trying to start my car. 145 As
is often the case, the identification of similarities is implicit. A person “need
not know why flooding the engine prevents a car or, as he speculates, a lawn
mower, from starting.” 146 Instead, “it is enough to know that the engines of a
car and a lawn mower are more or less similar.” 147
In the real-life example, the analogy is vindicated or discredited by
whether it works. If the lawnmower starts after a few minutes of rest, I can
assume that I was right in considering it analogous to my car; if it does not, I
was wrong. In law, however, the conclusion of an analogical argument is
typically normative, not probabilistic. 148 “We are not making a prediction about
likely facts in an unknown case but are instead making claims about how an asyet undecided case should be resolved in light of its similarity to a decided or

142. See WEINREB, supra note 35, at 4 (“There is something distinctive about legal reasoning,
which is its reliance on analogy.”).
143. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 2 (1948) (“The finding of
similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process.”).
144. Martin Golding, Argument by Analogy in the Law, in ANALOGY AND EXEMPLARY
REASONING IN LEGAL DISCOURSE 123, 131 (Hendrik Kapein & Bastiaan van der Velden eds., 2018).
145. The example is Weinreb’s, which he describes as a type of practical analogical reasoning. See
WEINREB, supra note 35, at 68–69.
146. Id. at 70.
147. Id.
148. Of course, one could reason analogically in law for consequentialist reasons that are grounded
in empirical predictions. For example, I might argue for borrowing from First Amendment principles
because I think that doing so will create a more robust Second Amendment right. That could be a type
of borrowing that, like everyday analogical reasoning, turns on whether it works. I am grateful to
Darrell Miller for this point.
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clear case.” 149 The conclusion of an analogical argument in law is typically that
cases X and Y ought to be treated the same. The stakes are thus higher in
evaluating claimed similarities that purport to justify legal analogies.
This type of reasoning typifies the common law. Frederick Schauer
explains with the example of “Donogue v. Stevenson, 150 in which the House of
Lords ruled . . . that the bottler of a bottle of ginger beer would be liable to the
ultimate consumer of that product where the product was defective, in this case
for containing the remains of a decomposed snail.” 151 The question in a future
case is what characteristics of this situation were relevant for the Donogue court
to rule the way it did. “Suppose,” Schauer continues, “[that] a subsequent case
presented the question of liability in the context of a decomposed spider in a
bottle of sparkling water. Because spiders are not snails, because sparkling water
is not beer, and because the decision in Donogue v. Stevenson was only about a
particular event,” the answer does not follow automatically. 152
This example illustrates why, “[i]n order to assess what is a precedent for
what, we must engage in some determination of the relevant similarities
between the two events.” 153 Is the spider-in-the-water scenario relevantly
similar to the snail-in-the-beer one? The task of finding that similarity is not
internal to the events but must instead be extracted “from some other
organizing standard specifying which similarities are important and which we
can safely ignore.” 154 Or, as Cass Sunstein puts it, “one needs a theory of
relevant similarities and differences.” 155 In the ginger beer example, most of us
will think the two situations should come out the same. But to justify that
conclusion, we must articulate why the similarities are relevant and the
differences are not.
Constitutional borrowing is a type of analogical reasoning akin to
precedent in this same way. 156 Just as courts reason by analogy when applying
precedent to new situations, so too constitutional borrowing works through a
process of determining relevant similarities between constitutional rights. 157 As
149. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 744 n.17
(1993) (emphasis added).
150. Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) (appeal taken from Scot.).
151. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 183 (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz eds., 1991).
152. Id.
153. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1987).
154. Id.
155. Sunstein, supra note 149, at 774.
156. Laurin, supra note 19, at 722 (“Borrowing ‘works’ in the first instance only where there is some
plausible resonance or fit between the source and target doctrines . . . .” (emphasis omitted)).
157. To be sure, borrowing is different than precedent applying in the sense that when borrowing,
there is no generalization from a particular application. But finding the relevant similarities between
rights requires the same type of normative evaluation—what counts as relevant and why—as finding
the relevant factual predicates from which to generalize a rule from a prior case.
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Golding writes about analogies, “[t]he crucial question is whether the compared
objects resemble (and differ from) one another in relevant respects, that is,
respects that are relevant to possession of the inferred resemblance.” 158
The same is true for borrowing. No one argues that the government must
allow consenting adults to have sex in public just because those adults may carry
guns in public. 159 Both sexual intimacy and the right to bear arms are
fundamental rights, true, but that similarity alone does not justify importing
the entire doctrine from one context to another. 160
There are, then, at least two reasons to think that constitutional borrowing
involves analogical reasoning in the same way as applying precedent does. The
first involves the similar argument form. Using an example from how courts
borrow from the First Amendment, the argument works as follows:
(i) The Second Amendment protects a fundamental, preconstitutional
“right of the people.”
(ii) The First Amendment protects a fundamental, preconstitutional
“right of the people.”
(iii) First Amendment claims are generally resolved using strict
scrutiny.
(iv) Being a fundamental, preconstitutional, individual right is relevant
to receiving strict-scrutiny analysis.
(vi) Therefore, unless there are countervailing considerations, Second
Amendment claims should also be resolved using strict scrutiny. 161

158. Golding, supra note 144, at 124.
159. This analogy has remarkable staying power in Second Amendment reasoning. See, e.g., Moore
v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (discussing the analogy); Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d
439, 458 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Nordykes counter that the Ordinance indirectly burdens effective,
armed self-defense because it makes it more difficult to purchase guns. They point to case law on the
right to sexual privacy as an analog.”) vacated, 611 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2010). Dorf, supra note 128, at
232–33; (discussing the analogy); Volokh, supra note 77, at 100 (same).
160. See Volokh, supra note 77, at 100 (arguing that the example “illustrates why analogies between
constitutional rights, while often helpful, are often limited”). As Volokh explains:
A ban on public sexual activity is, for nearly all people, a modest burden on the right, because
it leaves people free to shift to a private place. At most, it makes sex slightly less convenient
and less spontaneous. . . . But self-defense can’t be shifted to a more convenient time or
location. You can’t invite a robber back to your place, where you might have a gun available
to defend against him, the way you can invite a lover to your place to have sex.
Id.
161. Timothy Zick highlights this “logic” of borrowing, though in a slightly different form. ZICK,
supra note 8, at 10. As he describes the argument form in the First Amendment context,
(1) Right X is similar to freedom of speech—in the sense that it is a “fundamental” right
worthy of heightened protection, or bears some other general resemblance to freedom of
speech.
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Judging this argument—and specifically the persuasiveness of Premise
(iv)—requires us to assess whether the characteristics specified actually are
relevant in a meaningful sense to whether Second Amendment claims ought to
be resolved using strict scrutiny. For now, the form is enough to give us one
reason to conclude that borrowing is a type of analogical reasoning.
Second, in both applying precedent and constitutional borrowing, there is
a perceived need to justify the source one picks to borrow from. Courts and
commentators do not typically import doctrine from another area of
constitutional law without explaining why that choice is appropriate. 162 In other
words, they recognize that some justificatory work is required. And, more
importantly, the reasons they give to justify the choice in both situations are
typically reasons of similarities. Just like when applying precedent, courts and
scholars pick doctrines to import by explaining the relevant similarities between
the Second Amendment and the domain borrowed from.
Furthermore, courts and commentators also say they are engaging in
analogical reasoning when they make the decision about whether to borrow.
Nelson Lund, for example, argues that “[t]he case law dealing with free speech
and the free exercise of religion provides a particularly good analogue” for
Second Amendment cases. 163 The Second Circuit similarly imports specific
ideas into Second Amendment cases “[b]y analogy” with the First
Amendment. 164 Even when courts decline to borrow, the analogical nature of
the inquiry is clear: “The Court sees no reason to analogize rights under the
Second Amendment to those under the First, as plenty of case authority exists
to provide a clear framework of analysis to facial challenges, without poaching
precedent from another Amendment’s framework.” 165
(2) As a result of two-plus centuries of adjudicating free speech claims, there is a welldeveloped doctrinal framework to draw upon.
(3) Therefore, we ought to utilize the doctrines and principles developed to define free speech
rights to determine the proper meaning, scope, and enforcement of Right X.
Id.
162. Sometimes, however, there is no explanation for an act of borrowing. But, as Schauer argues,
that may in some cases be more strategic than shoddy. Frederick Schauer, Analogy in the Supreme Court:
Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 405, 424 (2013). “[I]t should be recognized that
leaving an analogy unjustified may facilitate a strategy of leaving options open and retaining flexibility
to deal with a rapidly changing world, a strategy that may underlie, contingently and controversially,
the very idea of the common law itself.” Id.
163. Lund, supra note 87, at 1376.
164. United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2012).
165. Richards v. County of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1176 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom.
Richards v. Prieto, 560 F. App’x 681 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d
61, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Hightower argues that her facial challenge should succeed under particular
doctrines that were developed under the First Amendment: the prior restraint and overbreadth
doctrines. We disagree and find these First Amendment doctrines a poor analogy for purposes of facial
challenges under the Second Amendment.” (emphasis added)).
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This section establishes that constitutional borrowing is a form of
analogical reasoning that can be evaluated using the tools developed to assess
that practice more broadly. In the Second Amendment context, we can see how
these concepts play out by analyzing which justifications for borrowing arise in
this domain. The next section describes four types of similarities that courts and
commentators point to when explaining an act of Second Amendment
borrowing.
B.

Relevant Similarities in the Second Amendment

Second Amendment borrowing is a type of common law constitutionalism
guided by analogical reasoning. As such, identification of similarities and
differences plays a key role. 166 This section surveys the existing landscape. It
details four types of relevant similarities that courts and commentators use to
justify borrowing in Second Amendment contexts: (1) textual, (2) functional,
(3) historical, and (4) structural. 167 This overview is meant to be illustrative and
not exhaustive. Courts and commentators may provide other reasons to justify
an act of borrowing, but these are some of most prevalent ones in the case
reporters and law journals.
One note at the outset: these types of similarity justifications map
reasonably well onto Philip Bobbitt’s modalities of constitutional argument, and
this Article draws on his descriptions of some of the relevant categories. 168 One
reason for the overlap here is that precisely because Bobbitt’s modalities are
recognized forms of constitutional argument, similarities hinging on them
would be relevant when trying to justify borrowing from one rights domain to
another. For example, because textual arguments are an important modality in
constitutional law, textual similarities between two rights provide some reason
for thinking the rights ought to share doctrinal or methodological elements.
166. Golding, supra note 144, at 124.
167. Sometimes, however, the reason is purely precedential; other cases have borrowed from this
context, so we do too. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding
without further explanation that “the First Amendment is the natural choice” to borrow from because
“Heller itself repeatedly invokes the First Amendment in establishing principles governing the Second
Amendment”); Sitzmann, supra note 130, at 1992 (“Courts should borrow from the First Amendment
when interpreting the Second Amendment not only because of their similarities, but also because courts
routinely rely on such analogies.”). Borrowing for precedential reasons makes sense because “borrowing
begets opportunities for its own enlargement.” Laurin, supra note 19, at 723. As Laurin notes:
A court’s initial act of borrowing brings a new set of ideas and sources into play, not only in
the case where borrowing occurs, but in subsequent cases as well. At least for some time period,
advocates and judges (and their clerks) will be likely to return to the source doctrine in order
to better inform their application of the new, borrowed principle.
Id.
168. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1982)
(outlining a typology of constitutional modalities, including structural, textual, ethical, prudential,
historical and doctrinal arguments).
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The following sections show how courts and commentators have used
these characteristics as reasons to borrow methods of constitutional reasoning
when similarities are present. However, courts also refuse to borrow when they
perceive relevant dissimilarities, and in these instances, they engage in reasoning
by “disanalogy.” 169 This section traces both types of reasoning.
1. Textual
Arguments that rely on textual similarities between the Second
Amendment and another constitutional provision often presume that textual
similarity is a sufficient reason to borrow some set of ideas from another
constitutional context. For example, in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 170 the
defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), which criminalizes
the possession of firearms or ammunition by anyone not lawfully present in the
United States. 171 The defendant argued that the statute could not
constitutionally be applied to him because it violated his Second Amendment
rights. The Seventh Circuit thus had to decide whether undocumented
immigrants could ever be considered “the people” to whom the Second
Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear arms. 172 To answer that
question, the court looked to how the Supreme Court had construed the scope
of the Fourth Amendment’s protections for “the people.” 173 And it justified
borrowing this same framework in the Second Amendment context because the
“interpretation of the Second Amendment as consistent with the other
amendments passed as part of the Bill of Rights has the advantage of treating
identical phrasing in the same way and respecting the fact that the first ten
amendments were adopted as a package.” 174
169. Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal
Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 1006 (1996).
170. 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015).
171. Id. at 666.
172. Id. at 669.
173. Id. at 670.
174. Id.; see also id. (“Given our earlier conclusion that the Second and Fourth Amendments should
be read consistently, we find it reasonable to look to Verdugo–Urquidez to determine whether Meza–
Rodriguez is entitled to invoke the protections of the Second Amendment.”); United States v.
Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that not adopting the analogy “would
require us to hold that the same ‘people’ who receive Fourth Amendment protections are denied Second
Amendment protections, even though both rights seem at root concerned with guarding the sanctity
of the home against invasion”); Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment:
Citizenship and the Right To Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1538 (2010) (“If ‘the people’ referenced
in the Second Amendment meant citizens, while the same phrase in the Fourth Amendment meant a
broader class of persons with substantial connections, then the Second Amendment is exceptional in
requiring obligation and loyalty to—and recognition by—the state in order to seek its protection.”).
Jack Rakove notes the oddity, however, of those who argue for a consistent usage of “the people” as a
way to justify the individual-rights reading, and yet think the Second Amendment’s use of the term
“militia” does not import the meaning from the other places in the Constitution. See Jack N. Rakove,
The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 119–20 (2000).
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Others have used textual arguments in a similar way. Some, for instance,
have noted that the rights codified in the First and Second Amendments share
a similar “textual breadth” that warrants treating them the same by “defining
the scope of the rights . . . in a way that permits the government to advance
legitimate public interests without unduly compromising the rights at issue or
unduly trusting legislative wisdom.” 175
Courts also sometimes use textual dissimilarities as a reason to resist
borrowing. For example, in Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 176 the Ninth Circuit
rejected a gun dealer’s argument that his business had its own Second
Amendment rights. 177 In the course of doing so, the court noted that the
plaintiff “invoke[d] an analogy to First Amendment jurisprudence for his
contention that the Second Amendment independently protects commercial
sellers of firearms, suggesting that gun stores are in the same position as
bookstores, print shops, and newspapers.” 178 But the proposed analogy broke
down at a number of points, including at the textual one:
[T]he language of the Second Amendment is specific as to whose rights
are protected and what those rights are, while the First Amendment is
not. Compared to the Second Amendment’s declaration, after an
announcement of its purpose in the introductory clause, that a right of
“the people” to “keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed,” the First
Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press” is far more abstract. And, whereas
the Second Amendment identifies “the people” as the holder of the right
that it guarantees, the First Amendment does not state who enjoys the
“freedom of speech,” nor does it otherwise specify or narrow the right. 179
One way that courts and commentators attempt to justify or resist
borrowing, then, is by appeal to textual considerations. 180 These textual
justifications do some real work in Second Amendment borrowing, but
arguments from other types of relevant characteristics often do more.

175. Lund, supra note 87, at 1376.
176. 873 F.3d 670 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Teixeira v. Alameda County, 138 S. Ct.
1988 (2018).
177. Id. at 690.
178. Id. at 688.
179. Id.
180. Some commentators have even used the similar imprecision of the text as a reason to borrow.
See, e.g., Sitzmann, supra note 130, at 1991–92 (“The First Amendment, like the Second Amendment,
confers fundamental, legally enforceable rights, but it does so with ‘plain text [that] is not really all that
plain.’ Consequently, using the First Amendment to justify ‘extra-textual constraints’ on the Second
Amendment serves to better define the law and make it work in practice. This Part therefore analogizes
to the First Amendment to articulate an understanding of the Second Amendment that is practically
(and theoretically) viable.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
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2. Historical
Along with textual similarities, many courts and scholars justify borrowing
on the grounds of historical similarities. Arguments based on historical
similarities point to either the similar provenance of the rights or their similar
purpose, such as whether the rights guard against similar evils or predate their
codification. 181 These types of analogies rest on the argument that the Second
Amendment and the analogized right both arose from a similar setting or were
meant to guard against similar harm. 182 In this sense, an argument that rights X
and Y were both meant to guard against ill-effect A would be a type of historical
argument grounded in (a kind of) original public meaning of the purpose for
rights X and Y. 183 It would, of course, be possible to subdivide this category into
arguments that point to similar original purposes and ones that point to similar
historical settings. But for simplicity’s sake, this section groups both these types
of similarity arguments together under the “historical” heading.
Unsurprisingly, this argument often arises in areas where scholars have
advocated for historical tests. Miller, for example, argues that the Seventh
Amendment makes a good candidate from which to borrow because, among
other reasons, both the Second and Seventh Amendment codify “a
preconstitutional right whose scope is determined by extratextual historical
sources.” 184 In other words, the similar historical setting of the rights at
codification warrants similar treatment.
Defenders of a broad reading of the Second Amendment often draw
analogies with historical similarities to the First Amendment as well. The First
Amendment, they claim, is absolute once the court decides what “the freedom
of speech” encompasses using history and tradition. So too, say proponents of
this view, “when the Second Amendment protects the person, the arm, the
activity, and the location, it protects absolutely . . . .” 185 Both rights, in other
words, are delimited by (and only by) an inquiry into their history and tradition.
Arguments based upon similar historical purposes also abound. Kenneth
Klukowski, for example, argues that First Amendment doctrine should be
181. See BOBBITT, supra note 167, at 9–10.
182. Blocher and Morgan also suggest that this type of similarity may justify borrowing: “A
particularly relevant similarity for the purposes of doctrinal borrowing may be whether the rights were
designed to prevent similar constitutional problems.” Blocher & Morgan, supra note 79, at 330.
183. See BOBBITT, supra note 167, at 9 (“Historical arguments depend on a determination of the
original understanding of the constitutional provision to be construed.”).
184. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition, supra note 27, at 896; see also Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 592
(2008) (noting that “the Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendments, codified a preexisting right”). Because these rights existed before the Constitution was drafted, sources outside the
document shed light on what the rights were understood to include. In this sense, other legal sources,
such as Blackstone’s Commentaries or the English Bill of Rights, might be informative; so too might
other sources of popular understanding, such as pamphlets and public speeches.
185. Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of Gun Owners of America, Inc. in Support of Petitioners at 22,
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280).
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borrowed in Second Amendment cases because “[t]he conceptual foundation for
the reach of both Amendments is coextensive and coterminous.” 186 In his view,
the similar purposes of the rights means that “the rationales justifying various
speech restrictions should be analogous to corresponding restrictions of the
right to bear arms.” 187 Just as reasonable restrictions can limit First Amendment
rights, so too can they limit Second Amendment ones. And just as First
Amendment rights often prevail despite the potential for harm to ensue, so too
Second Amendment rights can prevail even when harm occurs to third
parties. 188
Finally, just like textual dissimilarities, historical dissimilarities can also
justify declining an invitation to borrow. Many courts use this rationale when
confronted with arguments that seek to import the First Amendment’s priorrestraint doctrine. As one court said, “The prior restraint doctrine is applicable
only in the First Amendment context. Its rationale is rooted in preventing risks
specific to the First Amendment: self-censorship and the difficulty of detecting,
reviewing, or correcting content-based censorship on an as-applied challenge.
These rationales do not apply in the Second Amendment context.” 189 Thus,
because the prior-restraint doctrine arose from a different set of purposes that
are unique to the First Amendment, courts decline to import it to the Second.
In both borrowing and refusing to borrow, courts consider history to be a
relevant consideration. Courts and commentators look to a shared historical
provenance or similar historical rationales when deciding to borrow and
distinguish away these grounds when declining to do so.
3. Functional
Another type of similarity that courts and commentators find relevant
turns on functionality—on how the rights operate in the world. For example,
one might argue that an analogy between the freedom of speech and the right
to bear arms “is especially useful for the simple reason that the First and Second
Amendments—unlike, say, the Equal Protection Clause—directly guarantee
the right to engage in an activity.” 190 Although these claims can be like
arguments from historical similarities that point to the purposes underlying a
186. Klukowski, supra note 25, at 442.
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Young v. Hawaii, 911 F. Supp. 2d 972, 991 (D. Haw. 2012), rev’d in part, appeal dismissed in
part, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Bolton v. Bryant, 71 F. Supp. 3d 802, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(“Although Bolton is correct that the First Amendment has served as an important interpretive
guidepost in developing Second Amendment jurisprudence, the analogy does not extend so far as to
import the entire prior restraint doctrine into the Second Amendment. The prior restraint doctrine
embraces concepts unique to the First Amendment; the primary focus of the doctrine is preventing
censorship and limiting the chilling effect of prior restraints on protected speech.”).
190. Joseph Blocher, The Right Not To Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012).
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right, they are different insofar as they focus on the right’s operation more than
its design. In other words, whereas arguments from historical similarities point
backward toward what the right was meant to do, arguments from functional
similarities point to how the right operates in a practical way.
Functional arguments to justify borrowing are common. For example, one
of the more frequent arguments is the functional argument used to justify
borrowing from abortion jurisprudence. Nicholas Johnson, for instance,
underscores this connection: “The Court’s abortion jurisprudence is uniquelysuited for building [a] foundation on which to build a standard for resolving the
assault weapons question” because in the two contexts “both the right, and the
restriction of it, put human life in play.” 191 Stacey Sobel similarly argues that
the undue burden test is the “the most legally appropriate because of the
tripartite interests at stake in abortion and firearm regulation,” including the
right-bearer’s liberty interest, the state’s interest in protecting life, and the
state’s interesting in maintaining health and safety standards. 192 In other words,
how the right functions—it can both protect life and potentially threaten it—
justifies importing doctrine from one arena to the other.
Similarly, commentators have pointed out that both the First and Second
Amendments operate as positive legal entitlements and, unlike other
constitutional rights, are not triggered only when the government undertakes
coercive action. 193 In fact, unlike the right to vote or the right to trial by jury,
these rights do not depend on the existence of the government at all. 194 “[T]he
First and Second Amendments are exercised by many millions of Americans
daily. People exercise free speech rights with many of the words they express
on almost any subject matter. And the mere act of owning a firearm is an
exercise of the Second Amendment, meaning almost 100 million Americans

191. Johnson, Supply Restrictions, supra note 77, at 1286.
192. Sobel, supra note 28, at 521; see also id. (“The Second Amendment has more in common with
the unenumerated right to abortion than with the other rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights because
those other rights do not typically involve acts that have the potential for serious immediate harm to
the individual exercising the right or to others.”).
193. Klukowski, supra note 25, at 431 (“Americans only exercise many of their constitutional rights
if they are suspected of running afoul of the law. However, since mere possession of a firearm is an
exercise of the right to bear arms, Second Amendment rights are exercised daily by tens of millions of
Americans, as are First Amendment rights. Parallels between free speech and gun rights suggest a
common doctrinal framework could govern both.”).
194. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights, Positive Rights, and the Right To Keep and Bear Arms, 83 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 35, 39) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (explaining that the use of technologies such as the printing press and firearms were viewed
as natural rights while the right to a jury trial and right against prior restraints were viewed as positive
rights).
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exercise that right continually.” 195 This similarity in the operation of the rights,
claim the proponents, justifies importing from one domain to the other. 196
Relatedly, the Ninth Circuit has declared that gun sellers are functionally
equivalent to medical providers in the abortion context, such that they can bring
challenges only (if at all) for harm to their customers, not to their own Second
Amendment rights. 197 “Never has it been suggested, for example, that if there
were no burden on a woman’s right to obtain an abortion, medical providers
could nonetheless assert an independent right to provide the service for pay.” 198
The right functions to protect the primary conduct in both circumstances, not
to protect those providing the rights bearers the means to effectuate the
substantive right.
Others have used functional dissimilarities to reject analogies. Michael
O’Shea, for example, argues that the analogy between obscenity and firearms
breaks down because “[t]he consumer of controversial written or filmed
literature can derive the full value of the material, whatever that may be, while
literally ‘sitting alone in his own house.’” 199 In other words, the full use of the
right can be exhausted in that setting. But the function of “defensive firearms
is to respond to external threats from others, collapsing the privacy analogy.” 200
Eric Ruben also argues for rejecting some First Amendment principles in the
case of the Second Amendment because “Second Amendment values (to the
extent they are clear from Heller and McDonald) and risks differ from First
Amendment values and risks in ways that implicate the perception of safety.” 201
The Third Circuit has likewise rejected importing some First Amendment
doctrines by highlighting the functional differences between the two rights. In
Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Attorney General of New
Jersey, 202 the court considered the constitutionality of a state ban on magazines
that could hold more than ten rounds of ammunition. 203 The plaintiffs argued
195. Klukowski, supra note 25, at 440.
196. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (identifying but rejecting
the plaintiff’s argument for borrowing from the First Amendment based on functional similarities).
The court found that plaintiffs “see the nature of the rights guaranteed by each amendment as identical
in kind. One has a right to speak and a right to bear arms. Thus, just as the First Amendment permits
everyone to speak without obtaining a license, New York cannot limit the right to bear arms to only
some law-abiding citizens.” Id.
197. Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 689–90 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom.
Teixeira v. Alameda County, 138 S. Ct. 1988 (2018).
198. Id. at 690.
199. Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second Amendment Right To Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition
and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 668 (2012) (quoting Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
200. Id.
201. Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 80 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 167 (2017).
202. 910 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018).
203. Id. at 110.
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that, like in the First Amendment, the state could not regulate the secondary
effects of firearms by suppressing constitutionally protected activity. 204 The
court rejected importing these standards: “While our Court has consulted First
Amendment jurisprudence concerning the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply
to a gun regulation, we have not wholesale incorporated it into the Second
Amendment” because “[t]he risk inherent in firearms and other weapons
distinguishes the Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights.” 205
The right to a gun, in other words, functions differently than the right to speak.
Conversely, courts use the positive rights distinction to decline to borrow
from rights that are not positive legal entitlements. As the Fifth Circuit said in
declining to treat “the people” of the Second Amendment the same as “the
people” of the Fourth:
The Second Amendment grants an affirmative right to keep and bear
arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective right
against abuses by the government. Attempts to precisely analogize the
scope of these two amendments is misguided, and we find it reasonable
that an affirmative right would be extended to fewer groups than would
a protective right. 206
This is the mirror image of the argument that the functional similarities
between the First and Second Amendments—both government-independent
affirmative rights—justifies borrowing there.
Judges and scholars thus view the functional characteristics of a right as
relevant to the borrowing inquiry. They assess whether the rights are negative
or affirmative, whether they create similar types of externalities, and whether
they can be vindicated or not by the same litigants.
4. Structural
Finally, some scholars justify borrowing based on the similarities in how
the Second Amendment and another right structure the relationship between
the citizen and the government. This type of reason could be seen as a subset
of arguments based on the historical similarities grounded in the purposes of
the right. 207 It is worth highlighting on its own, however, because it takes on a
very specific tone in Second Amendment arguments. As one commentator said
in justifying borrowing, “[T]he First and Second Amendment citizens are the
ones who will restore constitutional order if the constitutional rule of law itself
204. Id. at 122 n.28.
205. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
206. United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440–41 (5th Cir. 2011) (declining to import
Fourth Amendment precedent defining “the people” protected by the right).
207. One could, for instance, understand the nature of the structural check on governmental power
as part of the purpose for protecting the Second Amendment, just as such concerns underlie other
rights.
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is usurped by a government.” 208 These arguments can sound apocalyptic and
underscore a similarity in how the Second Amendment and another right orient
the citizen in society. 209 As Sanford Levinson notes, “[O]ne aspect of the
structure of checks and balances within the purview of 18th century thought
was the armed citizen.” 210
Mark Coon, for example, argues for using the Third Amendment to
“support[] a reading that the Second and Fourth Amendments both provide
very broad and very strong individual rights to the people designed to preserve
their individual liberties and protect them from the threat of an oppressive and
overbearing federal government.” 211 He sees in the Second, Third, and Fourth
Amendments a similar type of bulwark set up against the state’s power, and
particularly the state’s military power, that justifies treating each of these rights
as particularly powerful.
Others have pointed to this similarity with other constitutional
guarantees. Klukowski, for instance, argues that “[l]ike the Free Speech Clause,
the Second Amendment is premised on mistrust of governmental power.
Freedom to share information and opinions regarding the issues of the day, and
regarding those who wield or seek power, is a condition precedent to
enlightened democracy. Heller discussed the Second Amendment as a safeguard
against government tyranny.” 212
The structural arguments point to how a particular constitutional
protection seeks to guard against specific types of governmental tyranny or
oppression. Proponents of these analogies point out how the Second
Amendment and other rights—typically those enshrined in the First or Third
Amendments—are often key safeguards to maintaining a citizen’s liberty
against the state.
*

*

*

The task of finding similarities between the Second Amendment and other
rights has occurred almost completely on an ad hoc basis. Courts and scholars
confront a discrete borrowing relationship and work out (or not 213) whether
208. Kopel, supra note 25, at 457.
209. See, e.g., Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinki, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The Second Amendment is a doomsday provision, one designed for
those exceptionally rare circumstances where all other rights have failed—where the government
refuses to stand for reelection and silences those who protest; where courts have lost the courage to
oppose, or can find no one to enforce their decrees. However improbable these contingencies may seem
today, facing them unprepared is a mistake a free people get to make only once.”).
210. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 651 (1989).
211. Coon, supra note 29, at 70.
212. Klukowski, supra note 25, at 443 (footnotes and quotation marks omitted).
213. See Rogers v. Grewal, 140 S. Ct. 1865, 1865 (2020) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Court would not tolerate “justifiable need” restrictions on speech or abortion rights like it
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certain similarities justify that particular instance of borrowing. This part has
surveyed the landscape as a whole, with an eye toward cataloguing the typical
reasons invoked to borrow. The next part identifies the lingering problems in
current borrowing that lead to an untheorized practice that fails to heed the
different aspects of a right that can be borrowed.
III. A PATH FORWARD FOR SECOND AMENDMENT BORROWING
The preceding parts analyze the sources of Second Amendment
borrowing, unpack how borrowers seek to justify the practice, and explain how
we can assess it like ordinary analogical reasoning. Extrapolating from that
analysis, this part highlights two corrective steps necessary to make Second
Amendment borrowing more rationally grounded and theoretically justified.
First, borrowers need to identify and defend a value theory animating the right
to keep and bear arms. Second, borrowers need to focus not just on what other
rights are similar but on why that similarity justifies importing certain elements
and not others. This part raises questions for future scholarship about the best
ways to flesh out these two fixes.
A.

Taking Theory Seriously

One central shortcoming in current borrowing practice is insufficient
attention to the underlying rationale for the Second Amendment. For the most
part, the endeavor remains detached from theorizing about the nature and
purpose of the right to arms. Even when similarities are relevant (for example,
text, function, and so on), they should be used in the context of protecting the
guarantee the Framers crafted in the Constitution. And, in that respect, the
Second Amendment needs more theoreticians. “[E]ven ten years after Heller,”
note Blocher and Miller, “the Second Amendment has a surprisingly thin
theoretical foundation.” 214
Because the current practice is largely unconnected from this broader
rights-building project, it risks creating an incoherent landscape. As Timothy
Zick notes, First Amendment jurisprudence developed over decades, 215 with
courts and commentators working their way through time to discern the values
embodied in the right and the scope of protections afforded by its

tacitly has with Second Amendment rights but without making any argument for why those analogies
work).
214. JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT:
RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 150 (2018).
215. ZICK, supra note 8, at 236–37 (“Although it is part of a system of rights, the Second
Amendment will need breathing space to develop on its own, just as the Free Speech Clause has done
for the past century.”).
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codification. 216 Like the common law system that provides a model for
constitutional decision-making, the superstructure of the Second Amendment
can be “built out of precedents and traditions that accumulate over time.” 217
And that building requires attention to underlying values because “normative
theory must be the centerpiece of any adequate account of legal reasoning,
including reasoning from analogy.” 218
This lack of theoretical grounding allows for a detrimental kind of
instrumental, strategic cherry-picking in Second Amendment law and
scholarship. 219 It allows analogies to become unmoored from the deeper
theoretical justifications for the right. Take the oft-invoked First Amendment
analogue, for example. It has been widely assumed that those advocating for a
broader Second Amendment right would rely on a First Amendment
comparison to press their point. 220 But the First Amendment can be used not
only to justify expanding Second Amendment rights but also to justify restricting
Second Amendment rights. Which of these competing arguments makes the
most sense depends, in part, on the proper scope of the right to keep and bear
arms.
In Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 221 for example, the Seventh Circuit
used First Amendment analogies to restrict, rather than expand, the right.
There, the court reviewed a city ordinance that banned certain kinds of
semiautomatic firearms and large-capacity magazines. 222 In doing so, the court
used a common First Amendment concept, “consider[ing] whether the
ordinance leaves residents of Highland Park ample means to exercise the
‘inherent right of self-defense’ that the Second Amendment protects.” 223
Concluding that the ordinance left “residents with many self-defense options,”
the court found no conflict with the Second Amendment. 224
Without more attention to the rationales behind the Second Amendment,
like the century of work that has been done exploring the First, uncritical
216. See id. at 236 (“Interpretations of the Free Speech Clause have changed in response to
episodes of social upheaval, political realignments, academic discourse, and judicial dynamics.”).
217. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3 (2010).
218. Jefferson White, Analogical Reasoning, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 571, 573 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010).
219. See Laurin, supra note 19, at 674 (highlighting that “[d]octrine-makers might tolerate [a] more
tenuous fit” between the source and the target “where the strategic interest in borrowing is strong”).
220. Darrell A.H. Miller, Analogies and Institutions in the First and Second Amendments: A Response
to Professor Magarian, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 137, 140 (2013) (“Pro-gun advocacy swarms thick
with analogies between speech and firearms.”).
221. 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015).
222. Id. at 407.
223. Id. at 411 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)). The Seventh
Circuit’s formulation nearly mirrors that applied in the First Amendment. See Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989) (analyzing whether the challenged restriction “leave[s] open ample
alternative channels of communication”).
224. Friedman, 784 F.3d at 411.
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borrowing threatens to make the Second Amendment right into a less-thancoherent conglomeration of borrowed doctrines devoid of an underlying value
theory. More theorizing should thus precede (or occur with) borrowing.
Because the Second Amendment has been a live source of litigation for less than
a dozen years, courts should leave at least some room to allow the doctrine to
develop organically rather than squeezing established constitutional frameworks
into Second Amendment cases in ways that may not always fit the context. 225
It would, of course, be counterproductive to ignore the development of
other constitutional rights in fashioning the scope of the Second Amendment.
But borrowing without identifying why borrowing makes sense for some
doctrines and not others just masks hidden value judgments about the merits of
the Second Amendment. It also stunts the right’s doctrinal development,
leaving little room for Second Amendment jurisprudence to grow and adapt to
new and changing circumstances.
The theorizing yet to be done is a key component of acquiring the ability
to decipher between similarities that are relevant and those that are not. As
Weinreb argues, “[t]he legal knowledge and experience that lawyers and judges
bring to the facts of a case tell them . . . that some similarities count for the
matter at hand and others do not.” 226 We need more experience with and debate
over the values of the Second Amendment to formulate (and decipher) the best
justifications for borrowing.
The primary rationales for the right to keep and bear arms include the selfdefense, anti-tyranny, and autonomy views. 227 But it is not enough for
proponents to invoke one of these values. To deploy it in a constitutional
argument, they must also defend that underlying value theory. Using the selfdefense view, for example, one could argue that it represents the best vision of
the Second Amendment because it is the most comprehensive, philosophically
defensible, and durable over time. 228 As such, borrowing relationships that
support that core value are more justifiable than those that do not; similarities
that further that core value are more relevant than those that do not. A defense
of this theory would flesh out these arguments.
First, for example, one could argue that the self-defense view is the most
comprehensive because it captures both current doctrine and the views of the
majority of Americans. Heller said that “the inherent right of self-defense has
225. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 7, at 469 (describing how errant borrowing can foster discordance
because “[n]ot every legal idea is compatible with another—the relationships may not be intuitive, the
union may seem forced, and the result may be a jumble rather than a useful harmonization of existing
lines of thought”).
226. WEINREB, supra note 35, at 138.
227. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 213, at 151–52 (explaining the different views).
228. Cf. Cody J. Jacobs, The Second Amendment and Private Law, 90 S. CALIF. L. REV. 945, 976–
81 (2017) (describing competing views and arguing that the courts have settled on the self-defense
view).
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been central to the Second Amendment right.” 229 It is, according to the Court,
the “central component” 230 and “core” 231 of the right: the right was designed to
protect the liberty of individuals to use weapons to guard their lives, livelihoods,
and loved ones. 232 And most people envision weapons—not just guns, but
knives, pepper spray, stun guns, and other Second Amendment “arms”—as
tools to defend against violent attack. 233 The combination of accounting for
doctrinal reasoning and popular wisdom is a key benefit of this view.
Second, the proponent could argue that this view is the most
philosophically defensible. The right to defend oneself is deeply rooted in
history, natural law, and domestic and international law. 234 To be sure, guns and
other weapons are not necessary for self-defense. But placing self-defense at the
core of a right to a weapon helps set the parameters around such a right. 235 And
recognizing a right to defend oneself against violence helps maintain the dignity
and autonomy of the person. 236 It also helps explain why courts permit even
felons who are forbidden from possessing firearms to employ a necessity
defense to escape punishment. 237 One should not be forced to choose between
prison and death. 238
Third, one could maintain that the self-defense view is the most durable
over time; it makes adjudicating the constitutional right more administrable. A
229. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
230. Id. at 599.
231. Id. at 630.
232. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at 8, questioning, skeptically, that the Second
Amendment “had nothing to do with the concern of the remote settler to defend himself and his family
against hostile Indian tribes and outlaws, wolves and bears and grizzlies and things like that”).
233. See, e.g., John Gramlich & Katherine Schaeffer, 7 Facts About Guns in the U.S., PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://pewrsr.ch/2T7hCNA [https://perma.cc/Y2QE-U9TR] (noting that in
recent surveys two-thirds of gun owners cite protection as a major reason they own a gun, compared to
much smaller percentages identifying hunting, sport shooting, or collecting as a major reason).
234. See David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of Self-Defense, 22
BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 177 (2007) (“The human right of self-defense is affirmed by the concurrence of
many minds of different ages.”); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 116 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651)
(“A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, by force, is alwayes voyd. For (as I have shewed
before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and
Imprisonment . . . .”); see also generally JAN ARNO HESSBRUEGGE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PERSONAL
SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18–21, 25 (2017) (describing the breadth and depth of the
right to personal self-defense in international law).
235. See generally Ruben, supra note 14 (analyzing the notion of common-law self-defense in light
of Heller’s pronouncement).
236. See David Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 356, 361 (1987)
(observing that “self-defense has one of the characteristic features of a right: it ‘trumps’ ordinary
calculations of utility and social value”).
237. See United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d 471, 472 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[C]ommon sense dictates
that if a previously convicted felon is attacked by someone with a gun, the felon should not be found
guilty for taking the gun away from the attacker in order to save his life.”).
238. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 213, at 152–53 (describing self-defense rights of felons
and others).
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right to violent revolution, as the anti-tyranny view imagines, is inherently
unstable. Such a right could really and truly be exercised only once. 239 And it is
hard to envision how it could be vindicated in a courtroom. 240 Nor, at the other
extreme, is the autonomy view easy to maintain over time. It would require
overturning restrictions when sufficient numbers of citizens want access to a
certain type of firearm, without regard to the utility of that firearm in defending
against harm (or its enhanced proclivity to inflict harm). But a defense-oriented
right is stable and durable throughout changes in government and consumer
preferences because it is tied to well-grounded legal notions of necessity,
imminence, and proportionality. 241
Of course, there are strong criticisms of equating the notion of self-defense
with the constitutional right to keep and bear arms, many of which I share. 242
And, critics charge, the notion of self-defense is too abstract, having a legal value
both broader and narrower than the Second Amendment right. 243 That can all
be true at the same time one recognizes that self-defense values animate and
undergird the right. In any event, more theoretical work ought to drive the goal
of more fully grounding Second Amendment borrowing.
B.

Disaggregating Borrowing

Not only does current borrowing often occur without larger attention to
theoretical concerns, but it also has a tendency to treat source rights as
monoliths and stop after justifying why another specific constitutional domain
is similar in some respect to the Second Amendment to warrant borrowing. But

239. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Guns, Privacy, and Revolution, 68 TENN. L. REV. 635, 639 (2001)
(“The right of revolution exists as a final remedy for official tyranny.”); cf. also Silveira v. Lockyer, 328
F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“The
Second Amendment is a doomsday provision, one designed for those exceptionally rare circumstances
where all other rights have failed . . . . However improbable these contingencies may seem today, facing
them unprepared is a mistake a free people get to make only once.”).
240. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Revolt of the Masses: Armed Civilians and the Insurrectionary Theory of the
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 643, 676 (1995) (“No system of government can allow for its
own demise by violent overthrow. . . . That right exists, if at all, only when the Constitution’s system
for peaceful change ceases to function; it does not arise where a group—armed or otherwise—simply
dislikes or disagrees with a particular government decision or policy.”); Darrell A.H. Miller, Retail
Rebellion and the Second Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 939, 940–41 (2011) (“Heller’s right of self-defense
against tyranny suffers from a serious implementation problem. . . . If the Second Amendment protects
an individual right to defend against tyranny, what does such a right look like? . . . Specifically, what
does the Second Amendment say about retail forms of rebellion: threatening police officers, resisting
arrest, cop killing?”).
241. Robert Leider, Taming Self-Defense: Using Deadly Force To Prevent Escapes, 70 FLA. L. REV.
971, 995 (2018) (“Necessity, imminence, and proportionality are the traditional limitations on the right
of self-defense.”).
242. Ruben, supra note 14, at 104–05 (criticizing Heller’s failure to attend to the common-law
requirements of self-defense law).
243. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 213, at 152–53 (explaining why self-defense is not enough).
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this just helps to locate a suitable source to compare; it does not tell us which
characteristics of that source we are warranted in appropriating. 244
At this high level, the method would support importing all of the
doctrines, tropes, rationales, et cetera from that other domain if the similarities
are relevant. Or, if the arguments work by disanalogy, it would justify refusing
to borrow any elements from this other context. But this high-level similarity
justification is only the first step of reasoning by analogy. It tells us that a blue
car is more like a red car than a blue tie. 245 Or at least it tells us that the red car
is like the blue car in one relevant respect. To argue from that analogy, we must
justify inferring the particular characteristic we want to use.
Consider which of the frames in Part II is most fully justified. Are the
Second Amendment’s textual, historical, functional, or structural features the
most important? The answer has to be, at least in part, that most of the time
these similarities operate at too general of a level. For example, they do not
allow us to decipher which parts of the First Amendment warrant borrowing,
even if we agree that the two provisions share relevant textual, historical,
functional, or structural similarities. And so, just like with analogical reasoning
in the case method, we need to uncover what similarities are relevant for the
characteristics of the source from which we seek to borrow. 246
A concrete example will help clarify the problem. The First and Second
Amendments share some textual similarities; each guarantees a “right of the
people.” 247 That may indeed make the First Amendment a source for
borrowing. But then we have to ask whether sharing that common language
merits importing, say, the prior-restraint doctrine into the Second Amendment.
It does not, as we have seen, because the similar text is not relevant to why the
prior-restraint doctrine exists in free-speech jurisprudence. 248 In the terms of
Golding’s analogical-reasoning argument form, this textual similarity is not an
“H-relevant characteristic[]” for the prior-restraint doctrine, though that

244. I use these terms in the way Scott Brewer defines them: the “source” is the basis of an
analogical argument; it is the better-known item to which we compare the less known. Brewer, supra
note 168, at 966–67. The “target” is what we are trying to figure out. Id. The characteristics that we
know the source and target have in common are the “shared characteristics.” Id. And “the additional
characteristic that the source is known to possess and that the target is inferred to possess . . . [is] the
‘inferred characteristic.’” Id. In the lawnmower example, for instance, the car is the source, the
lawnmower is the target, the combustion engine is the shared characteristic, and “letting-it-sit-makesit-work” is the inferred characteristic. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
245. Schauer, supra note 161, at 416 (using this analogy).
246. Brewer, supra note 168, at 965 (“[I]n order for an argument by analogy to be compelling . . .
there must be sufficient warrant to believe that the presence in an ‘analogized’ item of some particular
characteristic or characteristics allows one to infer the presence in that item of some particular other
characteristic.”).
247. U.S. CONST. amends. I, II.
248. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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similarity might be relevant for importing other aspects of First Amendment
doctrine. 249
In short, constitutional borrowing needs to justify not just which other
constitutional rights can stand as appropriate sources in a given context but also
needs to pay attention to the more granular question of relevance for the
particular characteristic. As Sunstein says, “For analogical reasoning to work
well, we have to say that the relevant, known similarities give us good reason to
believe that there are further similarities and thus help to answer an open
question.” 250 Does the claimed functional similarity between reproductive
autonomy and the right to keep and bear arms warrant adopting the undue
burden test? If so, does that same similarity justify importing to the Second
Amendment the guidelines on parental notification and consent for minors’
exercise of the right?
Because much of the current Second Amendment borrowing works by
justifying the source domain and then assuming that that connection leads
inexorably to the conclusion that some element or another can be grafted into
the Second Amendment, it generates sometimes muddled and often
inexplicable transplantation. 251 A justifiable practice of borrowing needs to pay
more attention to how and whether the claimed similarities are relevant to the
elements that one seeks to borrow.
Putting it all together, consider again the argument to import an
“alternatives analysis” from First Amendment law, which looks to whether the
law leaves open enough other channels to exercise the right. The First and
Second Amendments share some functional similarities: both protect an
affirmative right to engage in potentially harmful activity that everyone
acknowledges the government has an interest in regulating in some manner and
exercising the right creates externalities. Those very features of the First
Amendment are relevant to the existence of the alternatives analysis. 252 And
they are what make such an analysis a relevant characteristic to import into
Second Amendment case law. Assessing whether a regulation leaves an
individual ample means to exercise her right to self-defense vindicates a core
interest of the Second Amendment. 253
249. Golding, supra note 144, at 131.
250. Sunstein, supra note 149, at 744.
251. Cf. Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 7, at 472 (describing transplantation).
252. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (upholding regulation of sound trucks after
describing the harms they can cause to neighborhood tranquility and recognizing that “[t]here is no
restriction upon the communication of ideas or discussion of issues by the human voice, by newspapers,
by pamphlets, by dodgers”).
253. As Blocher and Miller note, an alternatives analysis requires necessary attention to the
underlying values. Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and Adequate
Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279, 293 (2016) (“In order to evaluate the adequacy of alternatives,
one must be able to answer the predicate question: ‘Adequate with regard to what?’”).
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Consider also an analogy to the special solicitude for the home in First and
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, among others. 254 These other rights share a
historical similarity with the Second Amendment because they were designed
to protect important interests from governmental intrusion into the home.
Heller, for example, faulted the District of Columbia handgun ban for extending
“to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute.” 255 Borrowing from these domains a distinction in the force of the right
between public and private use fits both with the reasons they share the
similarity and also with the broader interests in self-defense. The home is where
the needs of self-defense are “most acute,” 256 and the common law has long
recognized greater authority to use force in one’s own home against threats of
violence. 257 It thus makes sense to borrow a rule that makes this distinction, such
as one establishing that “[t]he state’s ability to regulate firearms and, for that
matter, conduct, is qualitatively different in public than in the home.” 258
These examples are not exhaustive or conclusive, but they exemplify the
sort of work that needs to be done in Second Amendment borrowing writ large.
By focusing greater attention on both the theoretical underpinnings for the
right and the characteristics of appropriated elements, Second Amendment
borrowing can be a more fully justified and coherent methodology.
CONCLUSION
Like a newly discovered amendment, the Second Amendment has been
recently unearthed from the shelves of history. As one means of building a
constitutional infrastructure around that right, courts and commentators have
employed analogies to import the frameworks, methodologies, and substantive
254. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty protects the person from unwarranted
government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few exceptions, the
question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be
answered no.”); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Whatever may be the justifications for
other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s own home.”);
Miller, Guns as Smut, supra note 21, at 1305 (“This privilege of the home works a kind of alchemy with
the Constitution. Things of no constitutional value outside the home glister with constitutional
meaning within it.”).
255. Heller I, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
256. Id.
257. Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 MARQ.
L. REV. 653, 656–57 (2003) (“Generally, under the Castle Doctrine, those who are unlawfully attacked
in their homes have no duty to retreat, because their homes offer them the safety and security that
retreat is intended to provide.”).
258. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2012); see also id. (stating that
“[t]reating the home as special and subject to limited state regulation is not unique to firearm
regulation; it permeates individual rights jurisprudence”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458,
470 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A]s we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited,
because public safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”).
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doctrines from other rights domains. But much of that analogical construction
currently suffers from twin pitfalls that focus at once both too broadly and too
narrowly. The practice currently misses attention to underlying value theory
and to the characteristics of what is borrowed. Resolving these twin pathologies
in current practice will help anchor Second Amendment borrowing. But this
alone will not make the practice uniformly appealing or consistent across courts
and commentators because borrowing itself is a theory-laden enterprise.
Borrowing cannot be divorced from broader debates about constitutional
interpretation and methodology. 259 Some interpretive methodologies lend
themselves more easily to borrowing than others. An originalist approach, for
instance, tends to atomize constitutional rights and treat each one separately.
What is appropriate for one right, with one set of specifically chosen words and
particular historical setting, is not necessarily appropriate for another right.
Originalism thus might seem to drive away from borrowing. But a model of
constitutional interpretation in which a common law mode of adjudication
prevails may be more receptive to the practice. 260 Under this theory, judges
decide constitutional cases in the same way they reason in a traditional common
law case: analogically.
In addition, the choice of an underlying theory of constitutional
interpretation may itself drive decisions about when to borrow and how to
justify it. To the extent originalists borrow, for example, they may be more
inclined to privilege textual or historical similarities. They may disregard
functional similarities; they may conclude that they must reject some types of
borrowing, despite acknowledging relevant similarities in the source and target;
they might be more inclined to borrow from a rights domain that has been
interpreted using an originalist methodology than from one built upon a
different methodology; and so on.
In short, there will always be disagreements about whether an act of
borrowing is justified or warranted in a specific context. The debates about why
run deep. But this Article puts forward two ways to more fully ground the
practice of Second Amendment borrowing that ought to at least clarify the
stakes of this bigger debate: (1) focus more narrowly on the borrowed
characteristics and (2) attend more generally to the values underlying the
Second Amendment right.

259. Tsai, supra note 20, at 517 (“Differences in orientation and commitment, too, shape how one
sees the practice of constitutional borrowing from one legal system to another, or even between
jurisdictions or bodies of thought within a single legal system.”).
260. See Strauss, supra note 141, at 879 (describing and defending this model).
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